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3.1  Introduction 
Electricity supply is traditionally viewed as a natural monopoly. Econo- 
mies of scale in the generation of electricity and the necessity of an exten- 
sive transmission and distribution network to deliver it to final customers 
seem to favor supply by a single firm for a given geographic region. How- 
ever, Joskow (1987) argues that scale economies in electricity production 
at the generating unit level are exhausted at a unit size of about 500 MW. 
More recent econometric work finds that the null hypothesis of constant 
returns to scale in the supply of electricity (the combination of generation, 
transmission, and distribution) by U.S. investor-owned utilities cannot be 
rejected (Lee 1995). 
There is also growing dissatisfaction with limited incentives for efficient 
operation faced by a cost-of-service-regulated or government-owned elec- 
tric utility. According to this view, even if scale economies in the produc- 
tion of electricity exist, because of the incentives for input choice provided 
by the regulatory process or by  state ownership the mode of  production 
chosen by the firm does not allow them to be realized. For the case of a 
privately owned regulated utility, the firm earns higher returns for its share- 
Frank A.  Wolak is professor of economics at Stanford University and a research associate 
of the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
The author thanks Marshall Yan for outstanding research assistance. Severin Borenstein, 
Jim Bushnell, and Richard Green provided very helpful comments on a previous draft. Par- 
tial financial support for this research was provided by  the National Science Foundation. 
This paper reflects the state of electricity industry restructuring in England and Wales, Nor- 
way and Sweden, Australia and New Zealand as of  1 January 1998, unless otherwise noted. 
An up-to-date description of the status of electricity industry restructuring in these countries 
can be obtained from http://www.stanford.edu/-wolak. 
79 80  Frank A. Wolak 
holders by choosing an input mix to satisfy the demand for its output that 
does not minimize total production costs. For the case of a government- 
owned utility, the management chooses higher than cost-minimizing levels 
of labor or capital inputs to increase its political clout and long-term via- 
bility. Decision-making processes involving regulated utilities and regula- 
tory bodies acting jointly or state-owned-enterprises have historically had 
difficulty making economically efficient new generation capacity invest- 
ment choices in terms of both the size and the fuel type of the generating 
facility. 
As consequence, regulators in the United States and worldwide have 
recently implemented new regulatory schemes and organizational forms in 
an effort to improve the incentives for efficient operation of electric utilities. 
Until very recently, in the United States this restructuring took the form of 
performance-based or incentive regulation plans, where the revenue a util- 
ity is  allowed to earn is tied less to the cost of providing electricity and 
more to the attainment of performance goals as quantified by total factor 
productivity or some other measure of productive efficiency. 
Other countries have undertaken more radical approaches to restructur- 
ing their electricity supply industries. Following the privatization of  the 
majority of the generating assets of the formerly state-owned Central Elec- 
tricity Generating Board, the privatization of all of the area boards (local 
electricity distributors), and the introduction of a market for generation 
in England and Wales (E&W) on 1 April 1990, many Organization for Eco- 
nomic Cooperation  and Development (OECD) member countries have 
formed wholesale markets for electricity and introduced varying degrees of 
competition into the retail side of  the electricity supply industry. Most 
other OECD countries are currently in the process of implementing simi- 
lar reforms. 
The United States has been slow to undertake this radical restructur- 
ing process. As of 1 May 1999 only three regions of the United States oper- 
ate competitive wholesale markets for electricity-California,  PJM (all or 
part of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland, Delaware, Virginia, and the 
District of  Columbia), and New England (Massachusetts, New Hamp- 
shire, Vermont, and Maine). The California market was the first to begin 
operation,  on  31  March  1998. As  of  this  same  date,  the  incumbent 
investor-owned utilities in California faced competition for their retail cus- 
tomers. As of 1 May 1999, electricity industry restructuring activity exists 
through most of the United States.' Retail competition of some form exists 
in all states with a competitive wholesale electricity market, as well as in 
many other states. Several other states in the United States have enacted 
1. The Energy Information Agency of the U.S. Department of Energy maintains an up- 
to-date web site on the status of electricity industry restructuring in each state. See http:// 
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legislation to restructure their electricity industries. The vast majority of 
states have ongoing activity in the regulatory body that oversees the elec- 
tricity industry (usually the public utilities commission) or in the state 
legislature dealing with electricity industry restructuring. Only two states 
have no significant ongoing activity in electricity industry restructuring. 
All of the industry restructurings that have taken place in the United 
States and abroad are consistent with the view that competition should be 
introduced into the electricity supply industry wherever it is technologi- 
cally feasible. Only those portions of  the production process most effi- 
ciently supplied by a single firm should remain regulated. The prevailing 
view  is  that the technologies for electricity generation and retailing are 
both such that competition is feasible. As discussed above, economies of 
scale in generation are exhausted at levels of production significantly be- 
low  current  levels  of  industry output. Assuming that  all retailers have 
equal access to the transmission and distribution network and electricity 
from the wholesale generation market, significant increasing returns to 
scale in electricity retailing are unlikely to exist. On the other hand, be- 
cause competition in the transmission and distribution of electricity would 
require duplication of the current network, these two portions of the elec- 
tricity supply industry are thought to possess the features of  a natural 
monopoly. Therefore, the transmission and distribution sectors of the elec- 
tricity supply industries in all of these countries are regulated to varying 
degrees. 
Although privatization is  often part of this restructuring process, for 
all of the regions described in this paper both state and privately owned 
companies compete in  the  electricity generation market.  Some of  the 
countries  where  restructuring  has  taken  place  only  have  municipally 
owned distribution companies, whereas others have only privately owned 
distribution companies. The remaining countries have distribution sectors 
composed of a combination of  privately owned and government-owned 
companies. 
The market structure and rules governing the operation of the electric- 
ity industries in these countries are not the direct result of independent 
actions  by  market  participants-generators,  retailers,  and  customers. 
Consequently, it is perhaps a misnomer to call these trading arrangements 
markets, because most markets or exchanges arise from the voluntary ac- 
tions of buyers and sellers to form a self-regulating organization to facili- 
tate mutually beneficial trades. Each of the electricity markets that cur- 
rently exist around the world is the outcome of a deliberate government 
policy to restructure (and often privatize) the industry. The final form of 
the electricity industry in United States will be the result of joint decisions 
by state regulatory commissions and legislatures, as well as market partici- 
pants. In addition, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission must also 
approve all state restructuring plans. As I discuss later, the amount of 82  Frank A. Wolak 
regulatory oversight in the E&W market has increased since the 1990 re- 
structuring. The other newly established electricity markets are also sub- 
ject to significant regulatory oversight. Even the New Zealand electricity 
supply industry, which touts its “light-handed” approach to regulation, 
has had a significant amount of government intervention since the market 
first began operation. All of the plans for establishing electricity markets 
in the United States mandate continual monitoring of the industry by both 
state and federal agencies. For all of these reasons, it is more appropriate 
to think of  these restructured industries around the world and the pro- 
posed markets in the United States as alternative regulatory mechanisms 
to explicit price regulation for achieving the goals of  greater economic 
efficiency in electricity supply. 
From the perspective of economic efficiency, the optimal price for elec- 
tricity should be set to mimic the market price in a competitive industry 
with many noncolluding firms and minimal barriers to entry. This price 
has several desirable properties. First, it gives firms the proper signals for 
the timing and magnitude of new investment expenditures. In addition, 
because firms have no influence over this market price, they have the maxi- 
mum incentive to produce their output at minimum cost and can only 
earn higher profits by cost-reducing innovations not immediately imitated 
by competitors. The major impetus behind the liberalization of the E&W 
market was the belief that this new  form of market organization would 
come closer to achieving these regulatory goals for electricity prices than 
the preprivatization industry structure.2 
This new form of “regulation” of the electricity supply industry gives 
rise to a new  set of policy-making challenges associated with achieving 
economically efficient prices. The problem receiving the greatest attention 
is market power, which I define as the ability of a firm to cause a significant 
increase in the market price and to profit from this price increase. Firms 
subject to price regulation (either based on cost of service or an incentive 
regulation plan) have no direct control over the prices they can charge for 
electricity. Therefore, the explicit exercise of market power is not possible 
under traditional regulatory structures because the regulator, not the firm, 
sets the market price. A profit-maximizing regulated utility must use other 
means to increase its attractiveness to prospective shareholders. 
In  the markets for electricity currently operating  around  the world, 
firms explicitly bid prices at which they are willing to supply electricity. 
The desire of privately owned generation companies to maintain and at- 
tract shareholders implies that they will  attempt to exploit any potential 
profit-making opportunities through their bidding behavior. For this rea- 
2. An important concern expressed in a 1981 study by the U.K. Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission was that the preprivatization market structure did not provide the proper sig- 
nals for constructing the optimal amount and type of new generation capacity in a timely 
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son, from the perspective of consumer welfare, the success of a restruc- 
tured electricity industry can be judged by the degree to which opportuni- 
ties for significant economic profits are eliminated by  the self-interested 
actions of producers and consumers governed by the current market rules 
and carried out within the existing market structure of the indu~try.~ 
There are many observable differences in market structure in the vari- 
ous restructured electricity supply industries. These differences in market 
structure have led to the imposition of market rules designed to mitigate 
the ability of firms to exercise market power in the form thought to be 
most prevalent given the market structure that exists in the industry. There 
are also many differences in market rules across these electricity industries 
that are due to historical reasons or engineering concerns about network 
integrity. The interaction of these market rules with the market structure 
of the industry determines whether economically efficient prices are set by 
these markets. 
The purpose of this paper is to characterize this across-country relation- 
ship between market rules and market structure and spot prices for elec- 
tricity using the restructured  electricity markets in  England and Wales, 
Sweden and Norway, the state of Victoria in Australia, and New Zealand. 
By  studying the across-country  relationship  between market  rules and 
market structure and the behavior of market-clearing prices, insights can 
be gained about how to set market rules to mitigate the incentives firms 
have to exercise market power for a given market structure. 
The paper first describes the market structure and market rules govern- 
ing the operation of each electricity supply industry. Because the E&W 
electricity market was the first established among OECD member coun- 
tries, it has served as a model for much electricity industry restructuring 
worldwide. Consequently, I first provide a detailed discussion of the mar- 
ket rules and market structure of this industry. Then I describe these two 
aspects of the joint Norway and Sweden electricity market (Nord Pool), 
the Victoria Electricity market (VicPool), and the New Zealand electricity 
market (NZEM) in light of the discussion of the E&W market. Next I 
present various views of the time-series behavior of spot electricity prices 
in each of these markets and then relate these differences in the behavior 
of prices to observable differences in the market rules and market structure 
governing the operation of these electricity markets. This discussion fo- 
cuses on linking differences in market rules and market structure to differ- 
ences in the behavior of electricity prices across the countries. 
Although a detailed analysis of how these across-country differences in 
market rules and market structure foster or mitigate the exercise of market 
3. It is important to emphasize that firms can earn positive, zero, or negative accounting 
profits while earning zero economic profits. Zero economic profits implies that all factors of 
production are paid their opportunity cost. The opportunity cost of a piece of capital is the 
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power is a topic for future research, I will also point out some very prelimi- 
nary evidence consistent with the exercise of market power in the time- 
series behavior of these spot prices. Where possible, I will attempt to link 
this price behavior that appears to be consistent with the exercise of mar- 
ket power to observable differences across the markets in the rules govern- 
ing their operation and the structure of the industry. 
3.2  Industry Structure in the England and Wales Electricity Market 
The purpose of this section is to summarize the market structure and 
rules governing the operation of the E&W system. I first describe the re- 
structuring of the electricity industry in  England and Wales.  I then de- 
scribe the major players in the market and their relative sizes and the mix 
of generation capacity they own. The discussion then focuses on the rules 
governing the operation of the E&W electricity market. First I discuss the 
strategic weapons available to each of the market participants. Then I lay 
out the various stages of the price determination process and the potential 
opportunities for the exercise of market power that these rules create. I 
then discuss the evolution of the regulation of this market attempting to 
limit the market power of the two largest generators in the system. 
3.2.1 
Since 1 April 1990, all but a small fraction of electricity consumed in 
England and Wales must be  sold through a mandatory day-ahead spot 
market for electricity with market-clearing prices set on a half-hourly ba- 
sis. This market was formed as the end result of the breakup and privatiza- 
tion of the state-owned Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) and 
the privatization of the twelve area boards, the local electricity distribution 
companies, which were renamed regional electricity companies (RECs). 
The generating facilities of the CEGB were separated into three large com- 
panies. National Power  and PowerGen took over all existing fossil fuel 
power stations. Nuclear power plants remained state owned, under the 
auspices of Nuclear Ele~tric.~  The national transmission grid became the 
National Grid Company (NGC), which was jointly owned by  the twelve 
RECs. In addition to the three large E&W generators, Scottish nonnuclear 
companies (Hydro-Electric and  Scottish Power), Electricity de France, 
and a number of independent power producers (IPPs) also sell electricity 
into the E&W pool. The links to the E&W  market from Scotland and 
France are currently constrained by transmission capacity at 1.6 GW and 
2.0 GW. The maximum capacity available to serve the E&W electricity 
Market Structure in England and Wales 
4.  In July 1996, the U.K. government privatized the modern nuclear power stations, spe- 
cifically the advanced gas-cooled reactors and the pressurized water reactor. British Energy 
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market is approximately 60 GW, and the peak system demand is slightly 
more than 49 GW. 
The restructuring process has transformed the electricity supply indus- 
try  into  four  separate  subindustries:  (1)  generation,  (2)  transmission, 
(3) distribution, and (4) retail sales. With some minor exceptions to be 
noted,  the electricity supply industries  in  all subsequent  restructurings 
have been subdivided in the same manner. 
Because the technology of generation is thought to exhibit constant or 
decreasing returns to scale at current levels of production, a competitive 
market in generation is the foundation of all the restructured electricity 
industries I describe. Although the rules governing the operation of the 
market and the numbers, plant sizes, and mix of generating technologies 
employed differ greatly across the various industries, the goal of all of 
these markets is to foster economically efficient wholesale prices for elec- 
tricity. 
NGC runs both the financial and physical side the E&W electricity mar- 
ket. It serves as both the power exchange and the independent system 
operator  because  it  both  determines half-hourly  market-clearing  spot 
prices for electricity and operates the national electricity transmission net- 
work, making generator dispatch decisions in real time to manage conges- 
tion on the grid and provide the ancillary services necessary to guarantee 
reliable power to all final customers. Originally, it was jointly owned by 
the RECs, but in 1995 it was separated and is currently traded on the Lon- 
don Stock Exchange. 
Both transmission and distribution are thought to be natural monopo- 
lies, so that prices for bulk transmission provided by NGC are regulated 
by a price-cap mechanism. For the same reason, the distribution services 
provided by each of the RECs to customers in their service areas are regu- 
lated by a price-cap mechanism. 
The retail side of the market is divided into franchise and nonfran- 
chise customers. Nonfranchise customers are given the option of choosing 
their supplier from any of the twelve RECs as well as National Power or 
PowerGen directly. Initially, nonfranchise consumers were those with peak 
demands greater than 1 MW. On 1 April 1994, the 1 MW peak demand 
limit on these nonfranchise consumers was reduced to 100 kW. This size 
restriction  on customer peak  demand ceases to exist on 30 June  1999, 
when all residential customers will be offered this option (i,e,, all custom- 
ers become nonfranchise). The RECs are required to allow competitors to 
transfer electricity over their distribution systems at the same price they 
charge to themselves to provide this service to their retail customers lo- 
cated in their own service areas. 
Since the formation of the market, National Power and PowerGen have 
owned the majority of generating capacity and have produced at least 54.5 
percent of total electricity sold during each of the fiscal years the pool has 86  Frank A. Wolak 
operated through 1995196. PowerGen and National Power, most notably, 
have reduced their respective capacities steadily since the pool began. Na- 
tional Power began the 1990/91 fiscal year with approximately 30 GW of 
capacity, and PowerGen had approximately  19 GW of capacity. By  the 
beginning of the 1995196 fiscal year, these capacities were approximately 
20 and 15 GW, respectively. Contrary to this trend by the two largest gen- 
erators, several IPPs have  entered  the market, with,  in most  all cases, 
combined-cycle gas turbine technology generation facilities. The market 
share of electricity sold by  these two dominant producers has declined, 
from 45.5 percent (National Power) and 28.4 percent (PowerGen) in the 
1990/9  1 fiscal year to 3  1.38 percent and 23.12 percent for the 1995196 fis- 
cal year.5  There has also been a significant amount of entry by independent 
electricity suppliers who purchase electricity from the pool and sell it to 
final residential and business customers via the distribution network of the 
REC serving that customer’s geographic area. 
Another important feature of the market structure is the similarity in 
fuel mix between National Power and PowerGen. As of 1 April 1995, Na- 
tional Power’s capacity had the following approximate (because of fuel- 
switching capabilities) fuel mix percentages, 75 percent coal, 15 percent 
oil, 9 percent natural gas, and I percent hydroelectric. PowerGen’s approx- 
imate mix was 70 percent coal, 16 percent oil, 13 percent gas, and 1 per- 
cent hydroelectric. 
The vast majority of an RECs customers purchase electricity at rates 
fixed independent of within-year variations in the pool price. Before the 
start of the 1998/99 fiscal year, all residential customers paid fixed prices 
for electricity that could vary in a mutually agreed upon manner on a daily 
or weekly basis, independent of fluctuations in the pool price, for the en- 
tire fiscal year. The most common form of this pricing plan for residential 
customers had a fixed price per megawatt-hour for all consumption during 
the year, plus a fixed charge. Most of the remaining residential customers 
pay according to a fixed price per megawatt-hour for consumption during 
daylight hours and another fixed price per megawatt-hour for consump- 
tion during nighttime hours, plus a fixed charge. Almost all commercial 
and industrial users purchase power through similar annually negotiated 
fixed-price contracts, which also vary on a daily or weekly basis, indepen- 
dent of movements in the pool price. Consequently, within-day, day-to- 
day, or even month-to-month movements in the pool price have no impact 
on the prices all but a small fraction of customers pay because the pattern 
of prices they face does not change for the entire fiscal year. Only a very 
small fraction of E&W total system load, approximately 5 percent, is pur- 
5. Fiscal years run  from  l  April to 31  March of  the following calendar year. Nuclear 
Electric’s 1995/96 fiscal year market share was 22.5 percent, power imported from Scotland 
and France was 8.71 percent, pumped storage was 0.7 percent, and IPPs and others was 13.6 
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chased by final consumers according to variations in the half-hourly spot 
market price.6 
Because RECs provide electricity to the vast majority of their customers 
according to rate schedules fixed well in advance of the realization of pool 
prices, they  normally  hedge against  this  price volatility by  purchasing 
“contracts  for differences” (CFDs). CFDs are simply financial  instru- 
ments guaranteeing prices at which an agreed upon quantity of electricity 
can be traded at a future date.’ CFDs have been sold by generators as well 
as financial institutions and traders that deal in commodity markets and 
derivative securities. It is important to emphasize that CFDs are not for- 
ward contracts to deliver electricity. The E&W mandatory  spot market 
structure does not allow physical bilateral trades between generators and 
their customers. Unless a generating facility is dispatched by NGC as part 
of the day-ahead spot-market-clearing process, that plant cannot produce 
electricity. Consequently, if a customer and generator sign a bilateral con- 
tract for electricity supply, this does not guarantee that the generator will 
be dispatched in a manner that matches the customer’s half-hourly de- 
mands or any prespecified rate of production. Whether or not a plant is 
dispatched and the rate at which it is operated in a half-hour is the decision 
of NGC. A plant  that  is dispatched  by  NGC (that is, not constrained 
on) will receive the market-clearing spot price from the E&W pool for all 
megawatt-hours it produces during that half-hour, regardless of the long- 
term contractual arrangements it has made with an REC or large cus- 
tomer in the CFD market. 
CFDs were also used in the initial privatization  process to maintain 
employment in the U.K. coal industry. The government required National 
Power and PowerGen to enter into contracts for the purchase of a higher 
volume of U.K. coal than they wished at higher-than-world-market prices, 
thus maintaining employment in the coal-mining industry. Vesting CFDs 
between each REC and National Power, PowerGen, and other generators 
were designed to compensate these generators for the higher prices they 
paid for U.K. coal under these coal supply contracts. The strike price of 
these CFDs allowed the costs of the coal contracts to be passed on to the 
RECs, and the structure of the REC regulatory process-a  price cap with 
a Y-factor to pass through extraordinary cost increases-allowed  these 
costs to be passed on to final customers in the form of higher retail prices. 
6.  Wolak and Patrick (1996b) describe these sorts of retail price contracts in more detail. 
Patrick  and Wolak (1997) analyze the structure of  demand under real-time  prices for a 
sample of these customers from one of the RECs. 
7. Most CFDs guarantee a fixed price for a fixed amount of electricity in the following 
manner. Suppose a generator and an REC write a CFD for 1 MWH of  power at a strike 
price of f20/MWH. If the spot price of electricity is greater than f20/MWH, then the genera- 
tor pays the REC the difference between the spot price and E20 for the contracted 1 MWH. 
If the spot price is less than E20/MWH, the REC pays the generator the difference between 
f20 and this spot price for the contracted 1 MWH. 88  Frank A. Wolak 
In the first two years following privatization,  it is estimated that CFDs 
covered 84.3 and 89.1 percent, respectively, of National Power’s and Power- 
Gen’s generation, declining to 72.7 and 70.6 percent over the next two 
years (Helm and Powell 1992). Green (1999) presents slightly larger esti- 
mates of the amount of contracts held by National Power and PowerGen 
over this time period using more up-to-date data. 
3.2.2  Market Rules in England and Wales 
For trading to take place in the E&W market, participants must know 
how they are compensated for the bids that they submit, particularly how 
market-clearing prices are determined and how dispatch decisions for gen- 
erators are made. Recall that generators offer or “bid” prices at which they 
will provide various quantities of electricity to the E&W pool from their 
generating stations throughout the following day. They have two strategic 
weapons to influence the forty-eight half-hourly market-clearing electric- 
ity prices: (1) the daily decision for the price at which they are willing to 
supply electricity from  a fixed portion  of  each  generating facility and 
(2) the half-hourly decision whether to make that portion of each generat- 
ing facility available to be called on by NGC to produce power. For ex- 
ample, in the E&W market firms are allowed to submit three daily prices 
for a given generating unit, but the amount that they are willing to supply 
from that unit at each of these three prices can be varied on a half-hourly 
basis throughout the day. 
The day-ahead bid  prices and availability declarations submitted by 
generators are input into the general ordering and loading (GOAL) pro- 
gram at NGC to determine the merit order of dispatching generation and 
reserve capacity. The lowest price generating capacity is dispatched first, 
unless such dispatch will compromise system integrity. Subject to this ca- 
veat, dispatching plants in this “least cost merit order” gives rise to an 
upward-sloping aggregate electricity supply function for each half-hour 
of  the following day. The system marginal  price (SMP) for each half- 
hour of the following day is the price bid on the marginal electricity gen- 
erating unit (“genset”) required to satisfy NGC’s forecast of each half- 
hour’s total system demand for the next day, that is, the bid where this 
expected demand crosses the aggregate supply curve. 
The methodology and data input into NGC’s forecast of demand are 
readily available to generators prior to their submissions of bid prices and 
availability declarations for the next  day (Baker  1992; Electricity Pool 
1997; National  Grid Company  1995). This implies that  generators can 
compute NGC’s forecast of demand for all forty-eight load periods during 
the next day before they submit their bid prices and availability declara- 
tions. Moreover, this demand forecast that sets the SMP is perfectly price 
inelastic. Wolak and Patrick  (1996a) argue that these two market rules 
have important implications for the strategies used by generators to exer- 
cise market power. Restructured Electricity Markets: An International Comparison  89 
The  pool  purchase  price  (PPP),  the  price  paid  to  generators  per 
megawatt-hour in the relevant half-hour, is defined as 
PPP  =  SMP + CC, 
where the capacity charge is CC = LOLP  X  (VOLL -  SMP), LOLP is 
the loss of load probability, and VOLL is the value of lost load. CC is 
intended to provide a signal to generators of the necessity of new genera- 
tion capacity and to consumers that their consumption has a significant 
probability  of  requiring  the  maximum  amount  of  generating  capacity 
available in  that load period. VOLL represents the per megawatt-hour 
willingness of customers to pay to avoid supply interruptions. It was set 
by the director general of the Office of  Electricity Regulation (OFFER) at 
&2,00O/MWH  for 1990/91 and has increased annually in accordance with 
growth in the retail price index since that date. LOLP is determined for 
each half-hour as the probability of a supply interruption due to genera- 
tion capacity being insufficient to meet demand. LOLP is a decreasing (at 
an increasing rate) function of the expected amount of excess capacity 
available during each half-hour period during the present day.x  The greater 
the amount of capacity available relative to expected demand in any half- 
hour, the lower LOLP and therefore the lower CC per megawatt-hour paid 
to generators. Wolak and Patrick (1996b) argue that this relationship has 
important implications for the two largest generators’ strategies for ob- 
taining high PPPs. 
The pool selling price (PSP) is the price paid mostly by RECs purchas- 
ing electricity from the pool to sell to their final commercial, industrial, 
and residential customers. For the purposes of determining this price, the 
forty-eight load periods within the day are divided into two distinct price 
rule regimes referred to as Table A and Table B periods. During Table A 
half-hours the PSP is 
PSP  =  SMP + CC + UPLIFT  =  PPP + UPLIFT, 
where UPLIFT is a charge used to collect costs incurred when demand 
and supply are actually realized each day. UPLIFT is only known after 
the following day’s electricity demand has actually been satisfied. It is the 
only price uncertainty from the day-ahead perspective, and it is collected 
over at least twenty-eight Table A pricing periods each day. UPLIFT is 
zero for Table B pricing periods. Recall that the E&W market is an ex ante 
market in the sense that the PPP is set on a day-ahead basis using a de- 
mand forecast  rather  than  actual demand. The costs of  supplying the 
difference between the forecasted demand and the realized demand for the 
day is therefore recovered through the UPLIFT charge. 
This charge also compensates generators for reserve plant available but 
8. LOLP also depends on capacity offered in that half-hour during the seven previous 
days. Wolak and Patrick (1996b) describe the structure of the LOLP function in detail. 90  Frank A. Wolak 
not actually used to meet demand and start-up costs. Generators are paid 
for being available to produce electricity according to 
Availability payment/MWH = LOLP x (VOLL -  max[SMP, Bid price]). 
This approach to setting availability payments compensates a relatively 
high priced plant that is not used but is available less than a plant that 
bids close to the SMP. The remaining portion of UPLIFT consists of 
NGC’s costs of ancillary services (reactive power, frequency control, hot 
standby, and black-start capability). 
By  4 P.M. each day, the SMP, CC, and the identities of the Table A and 
Table B periods for all forty-eight load periods for the following day are 
communicated to pool participants. UPLIFT averages less than 10 per- 
cent of the PSP, and as discussed in Patrick and Wolak (1997), it can be 
accurately forecast on a day-ahead basis. Consequently, a large fraction 
of the ex post PSP is known on a day-ahead basis. 
3.2.3 
The Electricity Act of 1989 established OFFER, with Professor Stephen 
Littlechild serving as director general, to oversee the operation of  the re- 
structured U.K. electricity industry, from generation to transmission and 
distribution to final customers. At privatization there were no explicit con- 
trols over the PPP. Since then, Littlechild has instituted several regulatory 
changes in an attempt to inhibit strategic price and supply schedule offer- 
ings by generators. These include (1) an amendment of the original genera- 
tion license to require generators to make public their plans on capacity 
availability, (2) a change in the way LOLP is calculated, (3) voluntary price 
caps on the time-weighted and quantity-weighted values of PPP, (4) the 
divestiture of generating plant, and (5) incentive mechanisms to reduce 
the magnitude of UPLIFT payments. 
The original generation  license was revised, following the Pool Price 
Inquiry in December 1991, to restrict the ability of generators to manipu- 
late the PPP by  reducing the capacity made available to the pool. The 
changes require generators to provide, for public viewing, reports con- 
taining their criteria for determining the availability of their capacity to 
the pool, closing generating stations, and otherwise reducing generating 
capacity. Each year, generators must  also file detailed  forecasts of  the 
availability of each generating unit for the coming year and, at year’s end, 
file a “reconciliation” explaining any deviations from anticipated availabil- 
ity. This information is also publicly available. However, “generators are 
under no obligation under Pool Rules to declare any of  their Centrally 
Dispatched Generating Units (CDGUs) available to generate at any par- 
ticular  time, even  though  the CDGU may  be  operationally  available” 
(Electricity Pool, n.d., 10). Wolak and Patrick (1996b) describe various 
other actions by  the director general to encourage generators to declare 
capacity available. 
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During late 1993 and early 1994, OFFER issued reports and statements 
claiming  that  National  Power  and  PowerGen  were  exercising market 
power to drive up pool prices. This matter was resolved with the institu- 
tion of caps on time-weighted and quantity-weighted pool prices over the 
fiscal years 1994/95 and 1995/96 as part of a voluntary agreement, reached 
11 February 1994, between National Power, PowerGen, and OFFER after 
Littlechild threatened  to refer these generators to the Monopolies and 
Mergers Commis~ion.~  This agreement also included the divestiture of 4 
and 2 GW of coal or oil generating plant by National Power and Power- 
Gen, respectively. 
As a result of UPLIFT increases in the 1993/94 fiscal year, OFFER in- 
stituted in April 1994 the “uplift management incentive scheme” (UMIS) 
in an attempt to encourage NGC to minimize “avoidable costs” incurred 
in operating the E&W electricity market. UMIS was then replaced with the 
“transmission services scheme” (TSS) on  1 October  1995. TSS divided 
UPLIFT into the costs associated with reactive power, system constraints, 
transmission losses, and other ancillary services. Each category has a tar- 
get level of costs, and NGC was given a share of any savings below these 
targets as an incentive to keep these costs down. Total ancillary services 
costs in all subsequent fiscal years are significantly below their  1993/94 
level despite continuing growth in total annual energy production in the 
E&W system. 
3.3  The Electricity Supply Industry in Norway and Sweden 
Beginning  1 January  1996, the world’s only international  power ex- 
change opened in Oslo, Norway. Statnett Marked AS, a subsidiary of the 
Norwegian grid company, Statnett SF, has been operating the Norwegian 
power market since 1993. From 1991 to 1993, Statnett SF managed both 
the national grid and the power market, which was introduced following 
the Norwegian Energy Act of  1990. With the formation of the interna- 
tional Nordic power market, Statnett Marked AS changed its name to 
Nord Pool ASA; it is currently owned 50/50 by  Statnett SF and Svenska 
Kraftnat, the Swedish national grid operator. This power exchange inte- 
grates the Norwegian and Swedish electricity systems with ninety-six Nor- 
wegian and twenty-one Swedish participants as of March 1996. Denmark, 
Finland, and Russia all have participants  in the market. Statnett SF is 
owned by the Norwegian government and Svenska Kraftnat by the Swed- 
ish government. 
9. The Electricity Act of  1989 gives the director general the authority to refer firms to 
the Monopolies and Mergers Commission in order to make changes in the relevant license. 
Referrals can also be  made under  the Fair Trading Act of  1973 or the Competition Act 
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3.3.1 
There are three major differences between the Nord Pool market struc- 
ture and the E&W market structure. First is that 99 percent of installed 
capacity in Norway is hydropower, with the remaining capacity primarily 
oil and gas thermal power. In Sweden, approximately half of the total 
installed capacity is hydropower. Nuclear power has the next highest ca- 
pacity share, approximately 30 percent. Except for a small amount of re- 
newable generation capacity, oil and gas make up the remaining thermal 
power capacity. Consequently, more than  85 percent of the generation 
capacity in Norway and Sweden is either hydropower or nuclear power, 
technologies that have very low marginal costs of producing electricity. In 
contrast, more than 80 percent of the generating capacity in the United 
Kingdom is higher marginal cost coal-, oil-, or gas-fired generating tech- 
nology. 
The second major difference is that Nord Pool is not a mandatory pool. 
Generators and consumers decide whether they wish to sell or purchase 
electricity through this market. As a consequence, the majority of electric- 
ity in Norway and Sweden is still traded via bilateral contracts between 
generators and consumers, with the pool serving primarily as a wholesale 
market for marginal energy supplies. Nord Pool is actually composed of 
two markets operating simultaneously with the bilateral contract market. 
During any hour in the day electricity is transacted on each of these mar- 
kets and through bilateral contracts. In addition, there is a futures market 
where weekly financial futures contracts with maturities ranging from a 
week  ahead to three years ahead are traded. The market  most like the 
E&W market is the daily power market (DPM), or Elspot market. Here 
fixed quantities of electricity are traded at prices set on a day-ahead basis 
for twenty-four hourly periods. Because of differences between day-ahead 
electricity consumption and generation plans and actual consumption and 
generation plans, incremental electricity must be dispatched throughout 
the day to meet unexpected demand and to maintain system integrity. This 
market  for within-day electricity is  called the regulation  power market 
(RPM) in Norway and the balancing market in Sweden. 
The final difference between Nord Pool and the E&W industry is that 
much of the generation capacity is fully or partially state owned. When 
the Energy Act of  1990 “deregulated” the electricity supply industry in 
Norway, Statkraft, the state-owned integrated electricity supplier, was bro- 
ken up into separate companies providing generation, transmission, and 
distribution services similar to the CEGB in England and Wales, but it 
was not privatized. Statnett SF was created as the state-owned national 
grid company and system operator. Statkraft SF retained all generating 
plants. Statnett Marked AS was subsequently formed to run the electricity 
market. Statkraft SF owns approximately 40 percent of Norway’s hydro- 
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electric capacity and produces approximately 30 percent of its electricity 
output. The second largest producer in Norway is Hydro Energy, a subsid- 
iary of Norsk Hydro, the largest industrial end user of electricity in Nor- 
way. It produces approximately 10 percent of Norway’s electricity output. 
Many other smaller firms generate the remaining 60 percent of Norwegian 
electricity production. The vast majority of this capacity is owned by mu- 
nicipalities. Different from Norway, where there are more than two hun- 
dred generation companies (many of whom do not trade in the spot mar- 
ket), in  Sweden ten large generators  produce more than 90  percent  of 
Swedish electricity. Vattenfall, the Swedish state power board, generates 
approximately 50 percent of the electricity produced in Sweden. In both 
countries, the majority  of distribution assets are municipally owned. In 
Sweden, some of the large retail distributors also generate all or a large 
fraction  of  the  electricity  they  distribute.  For  example,  Sydkraft and 
Stockholm Energi, the two largest distribution companies, are the next 
largest generators after Vattenfall. In Norway, about half of the two hun- 
dred distribution companies also own generation assets. 
3.3.2  Market Rules for Nord Pool 
The rules governing the operation of the Nord Pool DPM differ from 
those for the E&W market in a number of dimensions. First, as discussed 
above, the DPM only trades a small fraction of the electricity produced 
within any hour during the day. In 1994, 14.6 TWH of electricity was sold 
on the spot market (1 TWH = lo9  kWH). In 1995, this figure rose to 20.0 
TWH. Total Norwegian electricity production was  113.6 TWH in  1994 
and 123.5 TWH in 1995, which implies only 12.8 and 16.2 percent, respec- 
tively, of total Norwegian generation was sold through the DPM in these 
two years. In 1996, 40.6 TWH was sold in  the new international DPM. 
Comparing this figure to 240.9 TWH, the total amount of generation in 
Norway and Sweden in 1996, implies that 16.7 percent of the production 
of the two countries is sold through this market. Sales in the RPM have 
remained stable over the three complete years Statnett Marked has oper- 
ated: 5.5 TWH of sales in 1993, 6.1 TWH in 1994, 5.6 TWH in 1995, and 
5.9 TWH in 1996. This is because the primary function of the RPM is to 
resolve imbalances between planned consumption as of the beginning of 
the hour and actual consumption during the hour. These consumption 
plans can be hedged on through bilateral contracts or on the DPM. Prices 
in the RPM very closely track those in the DPM, although they appear 
slightly more volatile. With the formation of the international DPM on 1 
January  1996, the Swedish national grid company and system operator, 
Svenska Kraftnat, formed a similar within-day power market, which it 
calls the “balancing market” (Balansetjinesten). 
The Eltermin market originally sold forward contracts for physical de- 
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a financial market that sells what are called Eltermin contracts, which are 
obligations to buy or sell a known quantity of electricity in a specific pe- 
riod of time at a price agreed upon at the time the contract is entered into. 
The contracts do not lead to physical delivery when they become due. 
Financial settlement is done against the DPM spot price. 
Eltermin contracts are either forward or futures contracts. The forward 
contracts are traded for blocks of power either for thirds of the year or for 
the entire year. These forward contracts are CFDs on blocks of power for 
the contract period. When the contract becomes due it is settled against 
the price in the Elspot market. 
Eltermin futures contracts are standardized along various dimensions. 
There are three different time horizons to these contracts: (1) week-long 
contracts, ranging from up to four to seven weeks in the future; (2) block 
contracts of four weeks long, for electricity delivered up to a year in the 
future; and (3) seasonal contracts for blocks lasting an entire season of 
the year, for electricity delivered over one year in advance. The final di- 
mension of the contracts is the time period within the day that the contract 
is valid. There are three types of contracts along this dimension: (1) basic 
power, all hours in the week (168 hours); (2) day power, from 7 A.M. to 10 
P.M.  Monday to Friday (75 hours); and (3) night power, the remaining 
hours not covered by the day power contract. There is continuous trading 
in this market five days each week, with sellers submitting ask prices for 
the contracts they wish to sell, buyers submitting bid prices for the con- 
tracts they wish to purchase, and trades taking place when bid prices ex- 
ceed ask prices. These contracts are purely financial contracts in the sense 
that financial settlement takes place daily for customers holding futures 
contracts, based on the day-to-day changes in the relevant Eltermin prices. 
During the delivery period, financial settlement of the contract takes place 
at the difference between the last price in the Eltermin market and that 
hour’s price in the DPM. Volume in this market has grown significantly 
over time. In 1994, total trading volume over all contracts was 7.1 TWH. 
In 1995, this figure more than doubled to 15.5 TWH. In 1996, the figure 
tripled  to 42.6 TWH. The greatest growth has been in the weekly and 
block contracts, with only moderate growth in the seasonal contracts. 
The DPM is similar to the E&W market in the sense that generators 
submit their bids to Nord Pool on a day-ahead basis. However, because 
this market  operates on top of the bilateral contract market, it is  what 
Nord Pool calls a “netto-market’’ in the sense that each customer must be 
in  balance during each hour the following day-its  supply obligations 
must equal the sum of its own generation,  bilateral contract purchases 
from other generators, and DPM purchases. The bid function submitted 
by  a DPM market participant gives the amount of power it will actually 
sell or buy each hour as a function of the market-clearing price. Recall 
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market must be sold on the spot market during each half hour. In addition, 
the aggregate demand determining the market-clearing price in the E&W 
market is the value forecast by NGC, whereas in the DPM, the market- 
clearing price for each half-hour is determined at the intersection of the 
aggregate demand and supply bid functions. For this reason, the DPM 
can also be thought of as a forward market for firm delivery during the 
following day. Different from the E&W market, there is no uncertainty in 
the quantity of electricity that is traded on the spot market the next day. 
In the E&W market, the difference between day-ahead generation plans 
and actual generation is handled through the UPLIFT charge. Generators 
in the E&W market submit their willingness to supply a specific quantity 
of electricity during the following day. This means that they are at risk to 
sell more or less than their willingness to supply at the PPP, depending on 
actual market conditions. In Nord Pool, because of the presence of the 
RPM, the DPM is a firm financial commitment for a fixed price and quan- 
tity of electricity sold on a day-ahead basis. For this reason, one can also 
think of the DPM as a day-ahead market for CFDs written against the 
RPM price. 
There is also a geographic dimension to the price-setting process in the 
DPM that is different from the E&W market, where there is a single price 
for  electricity  in  each  half-hour,  except  for  electricity  produced  by 
constrained-on generators. Every Wednesday, Nord Pool sends to market 
participants either electronically or by fax two types of information about 
how bids should be submitted for trade in the DPM during the following 
week.  This  information  defines  the  geographic  areas  of  Norway  and 
Sweden for which participants will submit bids. These bid areas are deter- 
mined using historical  generation  and consumption data, transmission 
capacity, and the description  of  the electricity grid. If  a  transmission 
bottleneck is expected to occur between two geographic areas during the 
week, separate bid areas will be defined on either side of the transmission 
bottleneck. These bid areas can also change over the course of the week 
based on planned or unplanned bottlenecks in the transmission grid. The 
second type of information Nord Pool supplies to participants is the bid 
price interval, giving the highest and lowest prices that must be covered 
by a bid  from each participant for all hours in the coming week. This is 
done to guarantee a unique price for each bid area. The bidder can submit 
a maximum of fourteen prices between these two prices, giving the amount 
it is willing to buy or sell as a function of these prices. 
All bids by market participants must be registered in standardized bid 
forms, one for each bid area, and submitted electronically or by  fax to 
Nord Pool by  noon the day before actual physical delivery takes place. 
The bid gives the maximum hours the bid is valid (minimum one hour and 
maximum all of the hours a bid area is valid). These bids must be finalized 
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that  same day, Nord Pool  takes  this  information  and  determines  the 
market-clearing prices for each of the twenty-four periods starting with 
midnight to 1 A.M. the following day and ending with the period starting 
at 11 P.M. and ending at midnight the day after. The system price is deter- 
mined from the intersection  of the aggregate electricity supply function 
(bids to supply electricity as a function of price) with the aggregate elec- 
tricity demand function (bids to consume electricity as a function of price) 
without  taking  into  account  transmission  constraints.  If  there  are no 
transmission constraints, then all generators receive the same price for the 
electricity they produce. 
If there are transmission constraints, generators in different bid areas 
receive different prices for the electricity they  produce  in the form  of 
different transmission capacity fees across the different bid areas. Simi- 
larly, consumers in these bid areas purchase at different prices because of 
these capacity fees. In areas where generators want to sell more than can 
be transmitted, they will be required to pay a capacity fee to do so. Con- 
sumers in these bid areas will receive this capacity fee for all of their con- 
sumption in this area. In areas where bidders want to purchase more than 
generators are willing to supply, the price will be increased by a potentially 
different capacity fee. Generators in this area will receive this capacity fee 
in addition to the spot price for their  generation. Prices in the surplus 
generation area will fall and prices in the deficit generation area will rise 
until the amount electricity generators in the surplus area are willing to 
transmit to the deficit region equals the amount consumers in the deficit 
region are willing to take, and both are equal to the transmission capacity 
between the two bid regions. These actions by  Nord Pool end when all 
transmission  bottlenecks  are eliminated.  lo Bid  areas that  set the same 
prices are aggregated into common price areas. Market participants are 
then notified of these price areas, area prices, and the hours they are valid. 
Each participant  is told the contractual amount of electricity it will be 
called on to buy or sell in each price area during each of these hours and 
the total amount of power transacted on the DPM during each hour. If 
there are no transmission bottlenecks, the entire system becomes a single 
price area. 
The forward contract nature of the DPM is another way that it differs 
from the E&W spot market. In the E&W market, generators only know 
the market-clearing price for the next day; they do not know exactly how 
much electricity they will be required to supply to the spot market during 
each half-hour that day until the half-hour actually occurs. However, the 
presence of RPMs in Norway and Sweden, which operate during the next 
10. Because of very extensive transmission networks in Norway and Sweden, transmission 
bottlenecks rarely occur within the two countries. The major source of bottlenecks is trading 
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day to balance any discrepancies in a generator’s or consumer’s contrac- 
tual supply or demand obligations (including those from the DPM), fulfills 
this role in the Nordic power market. These unexpected deviations from 
plans are made up by purchases or sales into this market, so that the DPM 
clears the day before actual dispatch takes place. Consequently, the DPM 
is simply another contractual supply or consumption obligation (similar 
to a bilateral contract) market during the day actual supply or consump- 
tion takes place. In the E&W market, NGC serves the function of the 
RPM because it dispatches generation during the following day to supply 
the amount of electricity actually demanded (rather than the expected 
demand used to set the PSP) and to maintain system balance. 
During each dispatch day for the DPM, an RPM operates in each coun- 
try. The equation Production + Import = Consumption + Grid losses + 
Export must hold for each bid area. In Norway, each day before 7:30 P.M., 
bids are registered with the RPM. Generating stations that bid have to be 
able to alter their production within fifteen minutes. A bid is an option for 
the system operator and can take two forms. An upward regulatory bid 
indicates the price the market participant demands for an extra amount 
of power produced. A downward regulatory bid sets the price that actor 
is willing to pay for buying power (by producing less than planned). All 
bids are grouped according to price areas and sorted by price. The RPM 
in each bid area uses these bids to increase or decrease production in these 
areas, The market participant called on to increase or decrease its output 
is given at least fifteen minutes’ notice before it must produce. It is given 
no indication of how long it must produce but will be given at least fifteen 
minutes’ notice before it must shut down. When an hour of regulation has 
passed, the price in the RPM is fixed and one price is set for each price 
area. After each hour, each participant in the DPM calculates its imbal- 
ances in each price area-how  much more or less than it contracted for 
on the DPM did it actually consume or produce in that hour? This imbal- 
ance is settled in the RPM. If a participant consumes more than planned, 
it must buy in the RPM, and if it consumes less than planned, it must sell 
in the RPM. This implies that all DPM and bilateral market participants, 
even if they do not submit bids to the RPM, are involved in this market. 
The regulation market in Sweden operates in a different manner. By law, 
Svenska Kraftnat has the obligation to maintain balance between gener- 
ation and load in Sweden. All consumers of electricity are required to 
ensure that a “balance provider” has been appointed for their point  of 
withdrawal from the grid. Since 1 January 1995, Svenska Kraftnat has oper- 
ated the “balance service,” which involves agreements with approximately 
forty balance-responsible companies called “balance centers.” These com- 
panies have the responsibility in accordance with the Balance Obligation 
Agreement  to  provide  the  Swedish  electricity  system  with  the  same 
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Svenska Kraftnat is responsible for the balance settlement, that is, the 
calculation of the imbalance, of every balance center. It then operates an 
hourly market for imbalances that allows trading of electricity across bal- 
ance centers. Because of this congestion management scheme, Sweden is 
always a single bidding area in the Nord Pool bidding process. 
3.3.3 
Up until the formation of the international power exchange between 
Sweden and Norway, the Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Admin- 
istration (NVE) oversaw the operations of the Nordic power market. It is 
still responsible for monitoring grid operations in Norway and is respon- 
sible for setting the tariffs for the local distribution companies throughout 
Norway. Previously, distribution tariffs were set on a cost-of-service basis, 
but starting in 1997, NVE implemented a version of price-cap regulation. 
Because Nord Pool is not required by the Swedish government to operate 
under any particular license, the majority of formal monitoring of Nord 
Pool remains with NVE. 
There have been several inquiries into the reasons for high prices in 
Nord Pool. Following the formation of the Norwegian power market in 
1991, prices were the lowest they had ever been. These prices continued 
until  Statkraft SF publicly announced a policy of not supplying to the 
spot market at prices below 100 NOWMWH. Statkraft apparently dem- 
onstrated its determination to maintain market-clearing prices above this 
level by punishing deviators by flooding the market and driving prices to 
zero. Prices subsequently stabilized at significantly higher values. Annual 
mean prices in the spot market have been above 100 NOIUMWH for all 
years following 1992. The Norwegian Competition Authority (Prisdirek- 
toratet) investigated whether collusion between generators caused these el- 
evated prices, but it found little evidence in favor of this claim. Other pe- 
riods  of  extremely high prices  seem to be  explained by  unusually dry 
weather conditions. 
Regulatory Oversight of the Nordic Power Market 
3.4  The Victoria Electricity Supply Industry 
The state of Victoria has the longest running wholesale electricity mar- 
ket in Australia. The Victoria Power Exchange (VPX) was established un- 
der the Electricity Industry (Amendment) Act of 1994 and formally began 
operation on 1 July  1994. New South Wales (NSW) established a state- 
level wholesale market for electricity that began operation 10 May 1996. 
Effective 4 May 1997 interstate electricity competition between generators 
in NSW and Victoria to supply electricity to energy retailers in these two 
states began. Previously, trade between NSW and Victoria was limited to 
long-term contract transactions, and any short-term trades were based on 
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integration of these two markets to allow all feasible trades between the 
two states is the first stage in the establishment of the National Electricity 
Market for Australia, known as NEM  1. 
The ultimate goal of this process is to establish a single electricity mar- 
ket across Queensland, NSW, Victoria, and South Australia. Because the 
eastern seaboard of Australia is currently not a fully integrated system, 
modifications of the system must be completed before a competitive inter- 
state market can be  introduced. Following a process similar to the one 
that occurred in England and Wales, the plan is to separate transmission 
and distribution from generation for all of the vertically integrated and 
formerly government-owned utilities throughout  Australia and privatize 
or corporatize these new entities. One outcome of this process is a harmo- 
nization of the rules governing the operation of the two markets currently 
in operation in Victoria and NSW. The market structures of the two elec- 
tricity supply industries in Victoria and NSW are also similar in terms of 
the relative sizes of the generation firms and the mix of generation capacity 
by fuel type, although the NSW industry is a little less than twice the size 
(as measured by installed capacity) of the Victoria industry and the largest 
three generators in NSW control a larger fraction of the total generation 
capacity in their market than the three largest generators in Victoria con- 
trol of their market. Because the NSW market has operated for a short 
time and shares many market rules with the Victoria market, my discus- 
sion will focus on the Victoria industry." 
3.4.1  Market Structure in the Victoria Electricity Supply Industry 
Restructuring and privatization of the State Electricity Commission of 
Victoria (SECV) in 1994 took place at roughly the power station level. The 
generation sector was formed into five separate entities to be sold. As of 
28 March 1999 when Ecogen Energy was privatized, all of the generating 
units formerly owned by the SECV have been sold. Buyers are from within 
Australia  and  abroad.  For  example, on 21  May  1996, PowerGen, the 
second largest E&W generating company, purchased a 49.9 percent share 
of  Yallourn  Energy, with  the  remaining  shares purchased  by  investors 
from Japan and Australia.  On  1 April  1997, Edison  Mission Energy, a 
California-based U.S. firm, purchased the Loy Yang B station. On 4 Au- 
gust 1996, National Power, the largest E&W generating company at that 
time, purchased a 52 percent share of Hazelwood Energy. 
11. As of  13 December 1998, the first stage of the transition to a national electricity market 
for Australia, NEMI, ended. The operation of VicPool ceased, and responsibility for the 
management of the Victoria electricity market passed to the newly formed National Electric- 
ity  Market  Management Company (NEMMCO), which  operates an integrated  market 
between NSW, Victoria,  Queensland, Australian  Capital Territory, and South Australia. 
The current NEMMCO market rules are very similar to the final VicPool market rules de- 
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The distribution sector was formed into five privatized companies: Citi- 
Power,  Eastern  Energy, PowerCor, Solaris  Power,  and United  Energy, 
which are owned by a combination of U.S. utilities and Australian compa- 
nies. For example, PowerCor is owned by  the U.S. firm PacificCorp, and 
Eastern Energy is owned by Texas Utilities. There is an accounting separa- 
tion within these distribution companies between their electricity distribu- 
tion business and their electricity supply business. All other retailers have 
open and nondiscriminatory access to the wires of the other distribution 
companies. 
The high-voltage transmission grid initially remained in state hands but 
was renamed PowerNet Victoria. In early 1998, it was sold to a U.S. energy 
services company GPU Inc. and renamed GPU PowerNet. The VPX is 
separate from all of these entities. Its mission is to manage the wholesale 
electricity market, manage the security of  Victoria’s power system, and 
direct the development of the high-voltage transmission  system. This is 
different from the E&W model, where NGC also owns the high-voltage 
transmission system in addition to providing these three services. It differs 
slightly from the Nord Pool model, where Stanett SF owns and operates 
the grid, but Nord Pool ASA, a subsidiary of Statnett SF, runs the whole- 
sale electricity market. 
The Victoria electricity supply industry is significantly smaller than ei- 
ther the E&W or Norway and Sweden market. Peak demand in this mar- 
ket is approximately 7.5 GW, and the maximum amount of generating 
capacity that can be supplied to the market is approximately 9.0 GW. Be- 
cause of this small peak demand, and despite the divestiture of SECV 
generation capacity to five firms, at least three of the largest baseload gen- 
erators have sufficient generating capacity to supply at least 20 percent of 
this peak demand. 
More than 80 percent of generating plant is brown coal fired, although 
some capacity does have fuel-switching capabilities. Brown coal has a high 
moisture content and a low sulfur and ash content, but also a very low 
heat content relative to black coal, which is used in the NSW market and 
the E&W market. The brown coal power plants are located adjacent to 
large strip mines. Consequently, in spite of its low heat content, the very 
low cost of strip-mining brown coal makes these plants extremely low cost 
to operate. The operators of these facilities are also very reluctant to shut 
down these plants because more expensive fuels must be used to start 
them up. 
The remaining generating capacity is shared equally between gas tur- 
bines and hydroelectric power. In this dimension,  the market  structure 
of the Victoria electricity supply industry is similar to the E&W market 
structure, where there are two large, primarily coal-fired generation com- 
panies, National Power and PowerGen, which each control more than 25 
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3.4.2  Market Rules in the Victoria Power Exchange 
Although there are important differences, the VPX shares several fea- 
tures with the E&W market. In particular, the VPX is a mandatory pool 
where prices are set on a half-hourly basis using bids submitted on a day- 
ahead basis by generators and demand-side bidders. The rules governing 
the operation of the VPX have changed several times since the formation 
of the market in 1994. The latest phase is known as VicPool I11 enhanced. 
It commenced operation on 1 September 1996. Three major changes were 
made to the VicPool at this time. First, daily bidding by  generators re- 
placed weekly bidding. Second, more increments were added to the al- 
lowed bid  functions that generators could submit. Formerly, generators 
were able to bid the capacity of each generating unit into the pool in only 
three increments (similar to the E&W market), and up until the end of 
1994 generators were only allowed to bid a single increment for each unit. 
In VicPool I11 enhanced, generators are able to bid prices for their units 
into the market in ten capacity increments that cannot be changed for the 
entire trading day-the  twenty-four hour period beginning at 4 A.M. the 
following day. This rule is the same as the one in the E&W market because 
in both markets generators cannot change the price bid for each increment 
for the entire day but they can vary the amount they are willing to supply 
from that capacity increment on a half-hourly basis. 
A third change in the VicPool rules is that generators now must self- 
commit their generation capacity. Previously, the VicPool operated on the 
basis of central commitment, similar to the E&W system. Under central 
commitment, in their bids generators are required to submit start-up costs, 
start-up times, and minimum on and off times. NGC in E&W (and for- 
merly the VPX in Victoria) analyzes the costs and times presented by each 
generator and makes the start-up and shutdown decisions for all half- 
hours during the following day. Under VicPool I11 enhanced, generators 
are required to self-commit, which means that if  a unit is committed by 
its owner, the capacity of the unit will be dispatched up to the point that 
the bid price for that capacity increment is less than the market-clearing 
price for that half-hour. 
The other major difference between the VicPool and the E&W pool is 
that the VicPool is very close to a real-time market. Prices paid to genera- 
tors are based on a real-time forecast of the total system demand in the 
next five-minute interval. During each five-minute period in a given half- 
hour this demand forecast is crossed with the aggregate supply curve for 
that half-hour that can satisfy this demand forecast. Ramping constraints 
on generating units are respected in the five-minute-ahead dispatch pro- 
cess. If a unit willing to supply 100 MW during a given half-hour at a 
certain price can only supply an additional  20  MW with five  minutes’ 
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further up the aggregate supply curve for that half-hour to another unit 
to meet any remaining unmet demand. The five-minute price can only be 
set by a generator that is not constrained by its ramp rate during the next 
five minutes. The half-hourly price of electricity is then computed as the 
average of the six five-minute prices set during that half-hour. All energy 
produced during that hour is bought and sold at this ex post spot price.'* 
Longer horizon demand forecasts are used to schedule plant and make 
preliminary determinations of required ancillary services, such as reserve 
and reactive power, which are purchased under long-term contracts with 
generators. Because of the ex post nature of the VicPool there is no need 
for either a balancing market similar to that in Nord Pool or an UPLIFT 
charge as is the case in the E&W pool. 
A participant must not update or alter the self-commitment decision, 
the bid prices for each capacity band, or the elbows of the capacity bands 
for each unit bid after  11 A.M.  on the day before this bid is active. The 
available capacity declaration for a unit during a half-hour cannot be al- 
tered for thirty-seven hours before the start of the day that contains that 
half-hour period, except to reflect a change in availability of the unit due 
to an event or events beyond the reasonable control of that participant, in 
order to reflect an unexpected increase in availability of the unit, and in 
response to a change in market conditions that the participant could not 
reasonably forecast. 
Because half-hourly spot prices are determined after the half-hour pe- 
riod, it is not known whether supply will  be sufficient to meet demand 
when bids are submitted on a day-ahead basis. If demand exceeds or is 
equal to total supply during a five-minute period, then the price is  set 
equal to the value of lost load (VOLL), which is currently set equal to 
AU$5,000/MWH. 
There are several mechanisms for managing pool price risk in the Vic- 
Pool. There is no formal futures market similar to the one that exists in 
Nord Pool. Generators and retailers can hedge against pool price volatility 
using two instruments: (1) vesting contracts and (2) contestable contracts. 
Each generator in the VicPool holds a vesting contract with at least one 
distributor. The vesting contracts cover consumption by franchise custom- 
ers (those with no choice of electricity supplier) and large industrial cus- 
tomers on fixed-price contracts. The megawatt-hours covered under these 
contracts decline with the reduction in the size of the franchise market. 
The supply market becomes fully contestable (all customers can choose 
supply from any distributor) in December 2000. These vesting contracts 
are essentially two-sided CFDs for pool prices below $300/MWH and one- 
sided CFDs for pool price in excess of $300/MWH. Contestable contracts 
12. The basic features of this price-setting process are followed by NEMMCO, established 
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are CFDs signed between generators and retailers to hedge the risks asso- 
ciated with supplying their contestable customers with electricity at prices 
that do not vary with the half-hourly changes in the pool price. 
3.4.3  Regulatory Oversight in the Victoria Electricity Supply Industry 
The Office of the Regulator General in Victoria is responsible for over- 
sight of the Victoria electricity supply industry. It sets the prices for both 
transmission and distribution services, using a price-cap regulation plan. 
Because of the planned  integration  of the Australian  electricity supply 
industry, recently there has been oversight at the national level of the VPX 
from the Australia Competition and Consumer Commission. 
During the first two years of operation of the VPX, there were various 
inquiries into the exercise of market power because of sustained periods 
of high prices, despite a significant degree of volatility in these prices. En- 
try by new generators and changes in firm ownership as more new generat- 
ing companies were formed from the sale of SECV units has led to much 
lower prices, but to an increase in relative volatility as measured by  the 
ratio of the annual standard deviation to annual mean  of VPX prices. 
Concern has died down about the exercise of market power in the Victoria 
electricity supply industry. 
3.5  The New Zealand Electricity Supply Industry 
Historically, the New  Zealand  electricity supply industry was domi- 
nated by a state-owned agency that operated the generation facilities and 
the bulk transmission network. Electricity supply authorities handled lo- 
cal distribution as local governing bodies (power boards) or under local 
body ownership (municipal electricity departments). This organizational 
structure continued largely unchanged until 1987, when the Electricity Di- 
vision of the Ministry of Energy was restructured as the Electricity Corpo- 
ration of  New Zealand (ECNZ). At the same time, restrictions on entry 
into generation and wholesaling of electricity were removed. Because of 
excess capacity in generation, little entry took place. Despite being a state- 
owned enterprise, ECNZ was expected to earn a competitive rate of return 
on its assets. In 1988, ECNZ restructured itself into a corporate group 
with  four  subsidiaries:  Production,  Marketing,  Transpower,  and  the 
PowerDesignBuild Group. TransPower owns and manages the national 
bulk  transmission  grid,  and PowerDesignBuild offers consultancy  and 
contracting services. At the present time ECNZ remains state owned, al- 
though eventual privatization has not been ruled out. Since 1992, Trans- 
Power has been a fully independent state-owned enterprise. 
Reform of electricity distribution was spurred by  the passage of the 
Energy Sector Reform Bill in 1992, which corporatized the electricity sup- 
ply  authorities and removed franchise areas, starting in  1993 for small 104  Frank A. Wolak 
customers, and for all customers in 1994. Ownership of the distribution 
network remained primarily in government hands as local government- 
owned trusts or local government authorities, although some privatization 
has taken place and more is currently under way. Open-access nondiscrim- 
inatory tariffs must be set by all distribution companies, so that other elec- 
tricity retailers can supply electricity to customers. The electricity distribu- 
tion (“wires”) business of each distribution company is separate from its 
competitive supply business. 
3.5.1  Market Structure in the New Zealand Electricity Industry 
The New Zealand electricity system consists of two alternating current 
subsystems, for North and South Islands, connected by a 1,200 MW un- 
derwater high-voltage direct current cable. All capacity on South Island is 
hydroelectric. There is sufficient capacity on South Island to serve its an- 
nual electricity requirements, as well as to export some power to North 
Island, where there is both hydroelectric and thermal capacity. Approxi- 
mately  75  percent  of  North Island  demand  is  met  from  hydroelectric 
sources, with the remaining 25 percent split between geothermal sources 
and fossil fuel (coal, natural gas, and oil) sources, with the fossil fuel gen- 
eration (primarily from natural gas) approximately twice that of the geo- 
thermal. Annual electricity consumption for the entire country is approxi- 
mately 30 TWH per year, which is approximately one-tenth the annual 
consumption of England and Wales, despite the fact that the land area of 
New Zealand is approximately the same size as the United Kingdom. With 
approximately 3.5 million people in New Zealand, transmission and distri- 
bution accounts for a relatively large fraction of the cost of delivered elec- 
tricity relative to the rest of the world, roughly 50 percent  of the retail 
price of electricity. 
An additional important aspect of the New Zealand system is that most 
of the population resides in the northern part of North Island, whereas 
most of the major hydroelectric resources are in the southern part of South 
Island. Consequently, transmission constraints between South Island and 
North Island can play an important role in the electricity supply process. 
The generation  side of the industry is dominated by  the state-owned 
ECNZ, which prior to 1 February 1996 owned and operated more than 
95 percent of total New Zealand electricity generating capacity. On 1 Feb- 
ruary  1996, in preparation for the formation of  a wholesale market for 
electricity, Contact Energy Ltd. was formed as separate state-owned enter- 
prise from ECNZ. It took over more than 30 percent  of  the generating 
capacity formerly owned and operated by ECNZ.I3 The government also 
imposed a cap on new capacity by ECNZ until its generation market share 
13. More recently, on 1 April 1999, ECNZ was separated into three state-owned generating 
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falls below 45 percent. It is also prohibited from owning any of the retail 
electricity companies. ECNZ was also required to offer a substantial frac- 
tion of its capacity in the form of  “reasonably priced” CFDs. Several of 
the distribution companies own generating capacity, but none generates 
more than 250 GWH annually. Despite the retention of state ownership 
of  ECNZ and Contact Energy, the pattern  of  divestiture of  generation 
from transmission and distribution for New Zealand follows that of the 
other three industries. 
There are currently thirty-eight electricity distribution companies pro- 
viding equal access distribution services and electricity supply to custom- 
ers and one electricity retailer providing electricity supply only. The state- 
owned corporation TransPower owns and runs the bulk transmission grid. 
In this capacity it is also responsible for the purchase of ancillary services. 
3.5.2  Market Rules in the New Zealand Electricity Market 
On 1 October 1996, a wholesale electricity market in New Zealand com- 
menced operation under the name Electricity Market Company (EMCO). 
This market is a true ex post spot market. Similar to the VicPool and Nord 
Pool, there is  separation between the power exchange, which is run by 
EMCO, and  the  system operator, which  is  Transpower. Similar to the 
Nord Pool market structure, the wholesale electricity market is not man- 
datory. However, because of the concentration of generating assets in the 
hands of ECNZ and Contact Energy, the spot market trades a large frac- 
tion of the electricity sold in New Zealand. 
Because of  concerns about the capacity of the high-voltage cable be- 
tween North and South Islands and the level of line losses along this link, 
spot prices are set at reference nodes in  both North and South Islands. 
Generators submit offer functions giving the amount of capacity they are 
willing to supply as a function of the price for all half-hours during the 
following day for each generating unit. Each generating unit can have a 
maximum of five price bands, and all individual generating unit offer func- 
tions must be increasing in the offer price. Purchasers submit bid functions 
that are decreasing in the bid price and can contain up to ten price bands. 
Different from the markets in England and Wales and Australia, neither 
the price nor the quantity bands associated with the bid and offer func- 
tions can be altered for the duration that the bid or offer curve is valid.I4 
These offer and bid functions are used to perform a day-ahead prospective 
market, which results in a proposed dispatch schedule and forecast prices. 
Offer and bid functions may  be  freely changed up to four hours before 
14. The price bands associated with bids and offers cannot be changed less than four hours 
prior to the trading period. However, if a bona fide physical reason exists, the quantity bands 
can be changed less than four hours prior to the trading period. However, the Market Sur- 
veillance Committee is notified of  these quantity revisions and may rule on whether the 
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dispatch occurs. Dispatch must meet actual loads, but to the greatest ex- 
tent possible it should also match the loads obtained by using a least cost 
dispatch based on the latest generator offers. Prices are determined after 
actual demand has been satisfied by resolving the market-clearing model 
to meet the actual metered load at each node using the generator offer 
curves as of the beginning of each half-hour trading period. 
The New Zealand electricity supply industry uses a full nodal-pricing 
model, but  with  a direct  current  power  flow  approximation that  uses 
piecewise linear line loss functions. Reserve capacity procurement is inte- 
grated into the market-clearing process. Joint reserve and energy offers 
made by  generators are input into a single market-clearing linear pro- 
gramming problem to produce prices for energy at each node and two 
classes of reserve capacity in each island. Reed, Drayton-Bright, and Ring 
(1998) describe the operation of the reserve capacity portion of the spot 
market. Energy prices are set on a half-hourly basis at more than two 
hundred  nodes, with approximately thirty  of  these nodes points where 
generators sell into the grid. 
3.5.3  Regulatory Oversight in the New Zealand 
Electricity Supply Industry 
There is no explicit regulation of the generation, transmission, or distri- 
bution sector, aside from monitoring by  the New Zealand  Ministry of 
Commerce. As noted earlier, the New Zealand government has taken a 
“light-handed” approach to regulation of the industry. Parties have been 
left to form arrangements among themselves, with all parties being free to 
appeal to the courts or the Commerce Commission. There is a Market 
Surveillance Committee that acts as an independent monitor of the mar- 
ket. The EMCO rules allow the Market Surveillance Committee to recom- 
mend  rule  changes, cancel  rule  changes,  investigate  misconduct  and 
breaches of market rules, and discipline market participants for undesir- 
able behavior. The committee can also impose fines on market participants 
for violations of the market rules or what it determines to be undesirable 
practices. 
3.6  An International Comparison of the 
Behavior of Spot Electricity Prices 
This section characterizes the time-series properties of the spot electric- 
ity prices from England and Wales, Norway and Sweden, Victoria, and 
New Zealand electricity markets since their inception. Our goal is to char- 
acterize several dimensions of the time-series behavior of  prices in these 
four markets. Our ultimate goal is to relate differences in these dimensions 
of the behavior of electricity prices across the four markets to differences 
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this is an extremely difficult task, the analysis to be presented does appear 
consistent with the view that market structure and market rules cause sig- 
nificant differences in the behavior of spot prices for electricity across the 
four markets. 
One of the most striking features of prices from these electricity markets 
is their tremendous volatility within days and across days within the week. 
I would like to understand the extent to which this variability in prices is 
forecastable and how this forecastability varies across the four markets. 
Table 3.1 gives the annual average half-hourly (hourly in the case of 
Nord Pool) price and standard deviation of  price for each year in our 
sample in terms of the home currency of that country. For Nord Pool, 
prices are quoted in Norwegian kroner per megawatt-hour. The missing 
entries in the table are due to the fact that the electricity market did not 
operate during that year. For all markets, I only have data for a portion 
of the year in which the market  began, and data for only the first few 
months of  1997. The E&W market  data run from  1 April  1990 to 31 
March  1997. The Norwegian spot market data run from 4 May 1992 to 
16 May 1997. The Victoria data begin  1 July 1994 and end 3 May 1997. 
The New Zealand data begin 1 October 1996 and end 31 May 1997. 
Several conclusions are consistent with the results in table 3.1. First is 
that the mix  of generation technology has an impact on both the mean 
and standard deviation of market prices. Prices in the two markets domi- 
nated by  fossil fuel technology-E&W  and Victoria-tend  to be much 
more volatile than prices in the two markets dominated by hydroelectric 
capacity-Nord  Pool and New Zealand. The coefficient of variation, the 
standard deviation divided by the mean, for almost all years in E&W and 
Victoria are larger than those in Nord Pool and New Zealand. 
With the exception of Victoria in 1994 and 1995 versus 1996 and 1997, 
mean prices in the fossil-fuel-dominated markets tend to be more stable 
across years than prices in the hydroelectric-dominated systems.  l5  Mean 
prices in  the E&W market  are much more stable across the years than 
those in Nord Pool. As discussed above, a major determinant of the mean 
of prices in hydroelectric-capacity-dominated markets is the amount of 
water available. If there is little water, then reservoirs tend to be low and 
flow volumes in rivers are reduced, so that hydroelectric generators tend 
to be very reluctant to sell into the spot market during the winter season 
and spot prices remain high until the late spring and summer, when elec- 
tricity demand is much lower. The supply of energy inputs to fossil-fuel- 
based systems is not nearly as sensitive to local weather conditions. Be- 
cause there are relatively integrated international coal, natural gas, and oil 
15. There are several reasons to believe that there was a regime shift in the VicPool before 
and after 1 January 1996. Before this date, very few of the generators had been sold off, so 
that the SECV was effectively bidding all plants. In addition, before this date, there were 
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markets, prices for these fuels tend to be stable across years, so that the 
mean price of electricity from fossil-fuel-based markets should be stable 
across years. The  more variable annual  mean  prices  across years  and 
smaller variance in  prices within years in  hydroelectric systems versus 
fossil-fuel-dominated  systems is consistent with this view. 
There are three alternative explanations for the lower level of volatility 
in Nord Pool and the NZEM relative to the E&W market and the VicPool. 
First, both fossil-fuel-based systems, the E&W market and the VicPool, 
are mandatory pools, whereas the two hydroelectric-based systems, Nord 
Pool and the NZEM, have optional day-ahead markets. Consequently, the 
lower relative volatility in Nord Pool and the NZEM could be explained 
by holders’ of bilateral contracts for electricity standing ready to sell into 
the spot electricity market if prices become high enough. This willingness 
to sell into the spot market at high prices increases the elasticity of the 
supply response that any generating company might face if it attempts to 
raise its bid prices, so that much of the adjustment to high bids in the spot 
market will come in the form of reduced amounts transacted rather than 
increased prices, as is the  case in  mandatory  pools with  little, if  any, 
demand-side bidding such as in the E&W market, and to a lesser extent 
the VicPool. 
A second explanation for the result in table 3.1 is that the vast majority 
of generating capacity in the E&W market is privately owned and an in- 
creasing (over time) fraction of  the capacity in the VicPool is privately 
owned, whereas both Nord Pool and the NZEM are dominated by  large 
state-owned  generation companies. One would  expect  the  large  state- 
owned companies to pursue other objectives besides maximizing profits, 
whereas the major goal of the privately owned firms would be to maximize 
profits. Therefore, some of the volatility in the E&W market and the Vic- 
Pool could be explained as episodes of  successful and unsuccessful at- 
tempts to exercise market power. State-owned enterprises may also be un- 
willing to engage in  the risky  bidding behavior necessary  to  set these 
occasional high prices and may instead settle for lower but more certain 
revenue streams than privately owned firms. 
A final explanation can be traced to the differences in the bidding pro- 
cess across the four markets. In the E&W market and the VicPool genera- 
tors can alter the quantity supplied from each bid increment on a half- 
hourly basis, whereas in Nord Pool and the New Zealand market both the 
prices and quantities associated with the hourly supply curves submitted 
by  generators are fixed  for the duration that a generating unit’s supply 
curve is valid. The greater flexibility afforded to bidders in the E&W mar- 
ket and the VicPool to vary their supply curves on a half-hourly basis may 
allow generators to tailor their bids to set market prices that more closely 
follow the within-day pattern of total system load than in Nord Pool and 
the New Zealand market, where supply functions are generally fixed for 
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A final aspect of  table 3.1 deserves comment. Consistent with the de- 
scription of the differences in market structure between North and South 
Islands in New Zealand-cheap,  abundant hydroelectric power in South 
Island and most of the population in North Island along with more expen- 
sive fossil-fuel-based plants-the  mean price in the north is significantly 
higher than the mean price in the south for both years. In addition, prices 
in the north are also more volatile than those in the south, particularly for 
1996. This reflects the use of fossil units to meet system peaks in North 
Island.  Consequently, even  for  an integrated system such as the  New 
Zealand market, the region with the greater share of total electricity pro- 
duction from fossil fuel units experiences greater spot price volatility. 
To determine which market sells electricity at the lowest price, I convert 
each hourly or half-hourly price to U.S. dollars using the relevant dollar- 
to-home-currency exchange rate at noon that day obtained from the PA- 
CIFIC web site.16 Table 3.2 lists the mean and standard deviation of the 
half-hourly or hourly prices (in the case of Nord Pool) in U.S. dollars per 
megawatt-hour. The E&W market consistently has the highest U.S. dollar 
price for electricity for the years in which I have comparable data. For 
both 1994 and 1995, the U.S. dollar prices in the E&W market are signifi- 
cantly higher than those in Nord Pool or Victoria. In both of these years, 
Nord Pool set lower prices on average, although in  1996 and 1997, this 
order reverses, with VicPool U.S. dollar prices significantly lower than US. 
dollar prices in either Nord Pool or the NZEM. These low prices in Victo- 
ria can be explained in part by the extremely inexpensive Australian brown 
coal and natural gas purchased to generate electricity. The coal used to 
produce electricity in the E&W market is considerably more expensive. 
U.K. coal is more costly to mine, and purchasing coal from abroad entails 
significant transportation costs, which increases its price in the E&W mar- 
ket relative to Victoria. 
In order to better understand the pattern of volatility in electricity prices 
in home currency per megawatt-hour in the four markets, I compute the 
ratio of the difference between the highest and lowest prices over a given 
time horizon divided by  the average value of prices over that same time 
horizon. For example, for each day in the sample, I compute the difference 
between the highest and the lowest price for the day and divide that by the 
average price for that day. Repeating this calculation for each day in the 
sample for each market, and computing means, standard deviations, the 
sample minimum, and the sample maximum, yields the values given  in 
table 3.3. This table shows that  over all time horizons the prices in  the 
E&W market and the VicPool are considerably more variable than those 
16. Policy Analysis and Computing and Information Facility in Commerce (PACIFIC) at 
the  University of British Columbia, Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration 
(http://pacific.commerce.ubc.ca/xr/). Table 3.2  Annual Means and Standard Deviations of Spot Price of Electricity Converted to US. Dollars 
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Note: Prices converted to US. dollars per megawatt-hour using daily exchange rates. See table 3.1 note for market abbreviations. 112  Frank A. Wolak 
Table 3.3  Ratio of Difference between Highest and Lowest Prices to Average 
Price over Various Time Horizons 
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Note: Mean  = sample mean, SD = standard  deviation, Min  = sample minimum, and 
Max = sample maximum. See table 3.1 note for market abbreviations. 
in  Nord  Pool and  the NZEM. By  this measure of  variability, VicPool 
prices are more volatile than E&W  prices. Nord Pool prices exhibit the 
least amount of average variability over the four time horizons. 
Because I do not have a complete year’s worth of data for the NZEM, 
I cannot compute the ratio of the difference between the highest and low- 
est prices within the year divided by  the average price for the year for 
NZEM  prices. However,  the  greater variability in North Island versus 
South Island NZEM prices shows up in this measure of price variability 
for all available time horizons. Although the average variability of these 
prices is less than that magnitude in either the E&W market or the Vic- 
Pool, these prices are substantially more variable than Nord Pool prices. 
These results illustrate the differences in the time-series behavior of prices 
in systems where fossil fuels are used to meet peak demands as in North 
Island of New Zealand relative to systems where hydroelectric capacity 
is used to meet  system peaks as in  South Island of  New Zealand and 
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The next step in the across-country analysis of the behavior of prices 
focuses on the relative forecastability of the daily vector of prices in each 
country. This requires a model for the time-series behavior of the (48 X  1) 
vector of half-hourly prices or (24 X 1) hourly prices for Nord Pool, which 
I denote  Y,. After some preliminary analysis of each vector of prices, I 
settled on a time-varying mean for Y,  that depends on the day of the week 
and month of the sample period. I hypothesize that once M,, the (48 X 1) 
([24 X  11 for the case of Nord Pool) vector of means of  Y,, is subtracted 
from Y,, the resulting stochastic process is a vector autoregressive model 
of order 8. The statistical model I hypothesize for Y,  is 
(1)  WL)(Y,  -  MI)  =  E,, 
Where E, is a (48 X  1) ([24 X  11 for the case of Nord Pool) vector-valued 
white noise process with mean zero and covariance matrix 2, @(L)  = Z  - 
CP,L -  -.. -  CPp  Lp, where each CPi is a (48 X 48) ([24 X 241  for the case of 
Nord Pool) matrix of coefficients and L is the lag operator function de- 
fined by  Yr-k  = Lk  Y,.  The remaining discussion of the model is for case of 
forty-eight half-hourly prices, although the modifications necessary for 
twenty-four hourly prices are straightforward. Let Mri  denote the ith ele- 
ment of M,. In terms of  our above notation, Mri = XI’pi, where X,  is a 
vector of day of the week and month indicator variables for load period i 
and pi  is the vector of coefficients associated with these indicator variables. 
Excluding the pi coefficients associated with Mri,  for each element of M,, 
there are 16,120 = 8 X (48)2  elements of CP,,  CP2, . . . ,Q8  to estimate. Rather 
than present the more than 18,000 coefficient estimates (including the pi 
for each of  the forty-eight load periods) for this model, which are esti- 
mated by least squares applied to each of the forty-eight load period price 
equations, I provide several summary measures of the adequacy of this 
model and summarize what insights it provides about the forecastability 
of  Y,  for each market. 
To investigate the adequacy of equation (1) for each country, I compute 
the multivariate analogue of the Box-Pierce (1970) portmanteau statistic 
derived by Hosking (1980) for the (48 X  1) vector of residuals from equa- 
tion (1). This statistic is computed as 
P =  Tztrace(C:C-iC,C-,L), 
M 
where C,  =  T-Ii  E,E,‘r, 
r=l  r=r+l 
where E, is the residual vector from equation (1) for period t and C,,  is the 
sample covariance matrix of E,. Hosking has shown that the asymptotic 
distribution of P  is x2  with N2  X (M -  p)  degrees of freedom, where p is 
the order of the autoregressive process and N is the dimension of Y,. For 
all of the models estimated, I find little evidence against the null hypothesis 
that E, is multivariate white noise. 114  Frank A. Wolak 
Table 3.4 presents the R2,  the standard error of the regression, and the 
mean  of  the dependent  variable for each  of  forty-eight  ordinary least 
squares regressions of the half-hourly price on eight lags of this price and 
all other half-hourly prices. I find the largest R2-all  in excess of 0.84- 
are associated with load periods 33 to 38, which run from 4 P.M. to 7 P.M., 
the load periods in the day with highest prices on average as indicated by 
the sample mean of the PSP in each load period given in the third column. 
Load periods 33 to 38 are also the periods with the six largest estimated 
regression standard errors. The combination of these two results suggests 
that the explanatory power of the model is highest for those load periods 
i = 33, . . . , 38 with the highest unconditional variance in  Yrl.  However, 
despite the superior explanatory power of the model for these load peri- 
ods, the level of the estimated forecast variance is higher for these load 
periods than for any others. Past values of  Y,  therefore improve the pre- 
dictive power of the load period regressions for periods 33 to 38 signifi- 
cantly more than they do for the other load period regressions, but despite 
this fact, these load periods are still the most unpredictable in terms of the 
estimated level of their day-ahead forecast variance. This result is consis- 
tent with the view that there are short periods within the day when the 
PSP is above or below its unconditional mean, and the occurrence of these 
extreme prices in certain load periods within a day make them more likely 
to occur in the same load periods in neighboring days. 
Table 3.5 presents this same information for the (24 X  1) vector of daily 
Nord Pool spot prices. The most striking feature of this table is the uni- 
formly high explanatory  power of these twenty-four regressions. In all 
cases, the R2 is at least 0.99, which implies that almost all of the move- 
ments in hourly prices across days in Nord Pool can be forecast. In addi- 
tion, none of the hours appear to be significantly more predictable using 
past prices than other hours. For all hours during the day, the standard 
errors of the regressions are very similar in magnitude, although the hours 
during the day with higher average prices do have slightly larger estimated 
residual variances. 
Table 3.6 presents the information in table 3.4 for VicPool prices. The R2 
from the forty-eight regressions used to estimate the eighth-order vector 
autoregressive process indicate that VicPool prices are less forecastable 
than Nord Pool prices. The magnitude of the R2 are similar to those for 
the E&W system in table 3.4. However, different from the results in table 
3.4, I find that the higher average price periods do not have higher R2 
from the regression forecasting that price. In fact, the highest average price 
period, load period 26, has by far the lowest R2 = 0.44. Different from the 
case of the E&W market, the highest R2’s  occur for load periods with both 
low and high average prices. 
Because I only have a very short time series of prices for the NZEM, it 
is not possible to estimate an eighth-order vector autoregressive process Table 3.4  R2,  Standard Error, and Sample Mean of Dependent Variable for 
Regression Forecasting Half-Hourly Pool Selling Price in England 
and Wales 
Standard  Sample Mean 
Error of  Price 
Load Period  R2  Regression  (E/MWH) 
1  0.81 
2  0.78 
3  0.80 
4  0.80 
5  0.80 
6  0.80 
7  0.79 
8  0.79 
9  0.79 
10  0.83 
11  0.80 
12  0.82 
13  0.80 
14  0.80 
15  0.82 
16  0.76 
17  0.74 
18  0.72 
19  0.66 
20  0.66 
21  0.66 
22  0.66 
23  0.69 
24  0.69 
25  0.70 
26  0.70 
27  0.70 
28  0.71 
29  0.70 
30  0.73 
31  0.75 
32  0.79 
33  0.84 
34  0.86 
35  0.87 
36  0.87 
37  0.84 
38  0.85 
39  0.82 
40  0.81 
41  0.76 
42  0.75 
43  0.76 
44  0.79 
45  0.77 
46  0.77 
47  0.74 
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Table 3.5  R2,  Standard Error, and Sample Mean of Dependent Variable for 
Regression Forecasting Hourly Spot Price in Nord Pool 
Standard  Sample 
Error of  Mean Price 

































































































for these prices. I estimate the vector autoregression with the largest num- 
ber of lags possible given the time series of prices available to me. In this 
case, I am able to estimate a fourth-order vector autoregressive process. 
Table 3.7 presents the R2,  the standard error of the regression, and the 
mean  of  the dependent  variable  for each  of  forty-eight ordinary least 
squares regressions of the half-hourly spot price on four lags of this price 
and all other half-hourly prices for North Island spot prices. Table 3.8 
produces the same information for South Island spot prices. The South 
Island price results resemble the results for Nord Pool, consistent with the 
fact that South Island is dominated by hydroelectric capacity. The North 
Island results resemble the Nord Pool results, but they show more variabil- 
ity across hours in the R2  and the standard errors of the regression than 
do the South Island results. This is consistent with the use of fossil fuel 
plants in North Island. 
A final issue associated with the Y,  process is the extent to which forty- 
eight (twenty-four in the case of Nord Pool) distinct prices occur within Table 3.6  R2,  Standard Error, and Sample Mean of Dependent Variable for 
Regression Forecasting Half-Hourly Spot Price in VicPool 
Standard  Sample 
Error of  Mean Price 
Load Period  R2  Regression  (AU$/MWH) 
1  0.89 
2  0.89 
3  0.87 
4  0.87 
5  0.87 
6  0.86 
7  0.86 
8  0.84 
9  0.83 
10  0.80 
11  0.77 
12  0.78 
13  0.79 
14  0.81 
15  0.84 
16  0.85 
17  0.83 
18  0.82 
19  0.84 
20  0.84 
21  0.85 
22  0.85 
23  0.84 
24  0.87 
25  0.89 
26  0.44 
27  0.81 
28  0.81 
29  0.80 
30  0.78 
31  0.79 
32  0.79 
33  0.80 
34  0.79 
35  0.80 
36  0.82 
37  0.77 
38  0.81 
39  0.84 
40  0.81 
41  0.86 
42  0.86 
43  0.83 
44  0.83 
45  0.82 
46  0.80 
47  0.79 
































































































33.31 Table 3.7  R2,  Standard Error, and Sample Mean of Dependent Variable for 
Regression Forecasting Half-Hourly Spot Prices in NZEM-North 
Island Reference Node 
Standard  Sample 
Error of  Mean Price 
Load Period  R2  Regression  (NZUMWH) 
1  0.98 
2  0.98 
3  0.97 
4  0.97 
5  0.97 
6  0.97 
7  0.96 
8  0.97 
9  0.97 
10  0.97 
11  0.96 
12  0.96 
13  0.96 
14  0.96 
15  0.96 
16  0.97 
17  0.96 
18  0.95 
19  0.97 
20  0.96 
21  0.98 
22  0.97 
23  0.97 
24  0.96 
25  0.96 
26  0.97 
27  0.96 
28  0.97 
29  0.97 
30  0.98 
31  0.97 
32  0.96 
33  0.93 
34  0.97 
35  0.94 
36  0.92 
37  0.95 
38  0.95 
39  0.96 
40  0.97 
41  0.98 
42  0.98 
43  0.98 
44  0.98 
45  0.96 
46  0.97 
47  0.97 
48  0.96 
4.06  42.55 
4.22  41.71 
4.19  41.09 
4.26  40.54 
4.14  39.61 
3.85  38.71 
4.48  38.42 
3.90  38.08 
4.20  37.87 
4.19  38.03 
4.19  38.28 
4.12  38.80 
3.91  40.11 
4.23  42.31 
7.20  45.34 
10.50  50.84 
11.02  50.33 
11.57  49.21 
6.43  47.35 
1.33  47.04 
4.84  46.46 
5.19  46.30 
5.30  46.22 
6.56  46.76 
6.30  46.14 
5.22  46.10 
4.45  45.30 
4.38  45.36 
5.06  45.14 
5.00  45.32 
5.32  45.24 
7.54  46.42 
11.18  46.17 
7.46  47.67 
9.36  47.08 
10.06  47.55 
7.49  46.60 
6.19  45.90 
5.35  45.33 
4.61  45.03 
6.38  47.00 
6.80  47.53 
5.19  46.35 
5.15  46.03 
4.33  43.63 
3.76  42.32 
5.07  43.44 
5.92  41.59 Table 3.8  R2,  Standard Error, and Sample Mean of Dependent Variable for 
Regression Forecasting Half-Hourly Spot Prices in NZEM-South 
Island Reference Node 
Standard  Sample 
Error of  Mean Price 
Load Period  R2  Regression  (NZ$/MWH) 
1  0.99 
2  0.99 
3  0.99 
4  0.99 
5  0.99 
6  0.99 
7  0.98 
8  0.98 
9  0.98 
10  0.98 
11  0.98 
12  0.99 
13  0.99 
14  0.98 
15  0.98 
16  0.96 
17  0.97 
18  0.96 
19  0.99 
20  0.98 
21  0.98 
22  0.98 
23  0.98 
24  0.98 
25  0.98 
26  0.99 
27  0.99 
28  0.99 
29  0.99 
30  0.98 
31  0.98 
32  0.98 
33  0.98 
34  0.99 
35  0.97 
36  0.96 
37  0.99 
38  0.99 
39  0.99 
40  0.99 
41  0.99 
42  0.98 
43  0.98 
44  0.98 
45  0.98 
46  0.98 
47  0.98 
48  0.98 
3.13  37.40 
2.86  36.95 
2.88  36.48 
3.16  36.09 
3.04  35.23 
3.07  34.48 
3.39  33.87 
3.39  33.54 
3.48  33.32 
3.78  33.30 
3.30  33.34 
2.75  33.66 
2.78  34.74 
3.56  36.33 
4.89  37.98 
7.59  39.73 
5.35  38.81 
5.48  38.85 
3.21  38.98 
3.22  39.01 
3.43  39.16 
3.46  39.17 
3.30  39.13 
3.48  39.34 
3.35  39.25 
3.00  39.03 
2.93  39.21 
3.03  38.97 
3.12  38.56 
3.28  38.26 
3.33  38.29 
3.26  38.71 
3.36  38.90 
3.05  39.05 
5.53  39.56 
6.38  40.19 
3.56  39.60 
3.38  39.19 
3.22  38.85 
2.83  38.28 
3.16  38.07 
3.74  37.94 
4.13  37.90 
4.02  38.03 
3.87  37.52 
3.43  36.62 
3.64  37.31 
3.60  36.21 120  Frank A. Wolak 
the day. Specifically, are there really forty-eight distinct sources of stochas- 
tic variation in prices over the course of the day? The way I address this 
question is by asking if E, possesses a factor structure. By this I mean that 
E, can be written as 
E, =  AV,  + U,, 
where A is a 48  X  G (G < 48) matrix,  V,  is a (G X  1) white noise process 
with mean zero and covariance matrix ZG  (the identity matrix of dimension 
G), and U,  is a (48 X 48) white noise process with mean zero and covari- 
ance matrix a2Z, where Z  is a (48 X 48) identity matrix. The processes V, 
and U,  are assumed to be uncorrelated. This structure imposes restrictions 
on the form  of  the covariance matrix  of  C. In general there  are (1/2) 
(48)(49) = 1,176 distinct elements of 2. For  example, if  I  assume that 
G, the number of common factors, equals one, then there are forty-eight 
elements of A and u2,  which implies that the 1,176 elements of C can be 
written as functions of the forty-eight elements of A and d,  which implies 
a significant number of restrictions. The usual way to determine the extent 
to which there exists a factor structure for E, is to compute the principal 
components of C and the eigenvalues associated with these principal com- 
ponents. Defining trace(C) as the total variation in C, by the properties of 
the trace operator, the sum of the eigenvalues of Z equals trace(2). Conse- 
quently, I can get a measure of the extent to which a single principal com- 
ponent or group of orthogonal principal components explains the total 
variation in 2. (Another definition often used is the determinant of C (det 
(2))  because det(C) is the product of the eigenvalues. This would involve 
computing the ratio of the determinant to the product of a subset of the 
eigenvalues.) In table 3.9, I list the eigenvalues associated with the forty- 
eight principal components of the white noise process driving the vector 
of daily E&W prices. The last column computes the cumulative sum of 
the eigenvalues up to the number of principal components for that row 
divided by the trace of C. This table indicates that more than 20 percent 
of the total variation is explained by the first principal component. How- 
ever, the number of factors necessary to adequately model the structure of 
C appears to be large. For example, the cumulative number of principal 
components necessary to capture 90 percent of the total variation in 2,  is 
twenty-two. The large number of factors necessary to represent a substan- 
tial fraction of  the total variation  in  C is consistent  with the view  that 
there is not a single or even a small number of independent determinants 
of the pattern of spot prices within the day in the E&W market. 
Table 3.10 repeats this calculation for the (24 X  1) covariance matrix of 
the white noise process driving Nord Pool spot prices. This table is very 
different from the one for E&W prices. Over 75 percent of the total varia- 
tion in 2, is explained by the first principal component. It only takes three Table 3.9  Eigenvalues of Residual Covariance Matrix from Vector Autoregression 
Used to Forecast Vector of Daily Pool Selling Prices in England 
and Wales 
Principal  Percentage of 
















































































































































1  .oooo 122  Frank A. Wolak 
Table 3.10  Eigenvalues of Residual Covariance Matrix from Vector Autoregressive 
Model Used to Forecast Vector of Daily Spot Prices in Nod Pool 
Principal  Percentage of 
Component  Eigenvalue  Total Variation 
1  18.089  0.7537 
2  2.795  0.8702 
3  0.757  0.9017 
4  0.481  0.9218 
5  0.412  0.9389 
6  0.328  0.9526 
7  0.253  0.9632 
8  0.197  0.9714 
9  0.154  0.9778 
10  0.122  0.9829 
11  0.100  0.9871 
12  0.064  0.9897 
13  0.060  0.9923 
14  0.050  0.9944 
15  0.040  0.9960 
16  0.023  0.9970 
17  0.017  0.9977 
18  0.013  0.9982 
19  0.012  0.9987 
20  0.01 1  0.9991 
21  0.009  0.9995 
22  0.006  0.9998 
23  0.003  0.9999 
24  0.002  1 .oooo 
factors to explain more than 90 percent of the total variation in C. This 
factor structure is consistent with the view discussed earlier that there is a 
single dominant determinant  of unexpectedly high prices within a day, 
uncertainly about the availability of future water supplies. 
Table 3.11 presents the forty-eight eigenvalues of the estimate of Z for 
VicPool prices. The story that emerges is midway between the one from 
Nord Pool and the one from the E&W market. Approximately half of the 
total variation in C is explained by  the first principal component. Only 
fifteen factors, versus twenty-two in the E&W market, are required to ex- 
plain more than 90 percent of the total variation in 2. 
Tables 3.12 and 3.13 present the forty-eight eigenvalues of the estimate 
of C for North Island and South Island prices, respectively. Consistent 
with North Island use of fossil units, the number of eigenvalues necessary 
to explain 90 percent of the variation in C is ten. Whereas for South Island 
this number is eight, which is consistent with it being a hydro-based system 
where the opportunity cost of water is the primary determinant of price 
movements within and across days. Table 3.1 1  Eigenvalues of Residual Covariance Matrix from Vector 
Autoregressive Model Used to Forecast Vector of Daily Spot Prices 
in VicPool 
Principal  Percentage of 
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1 .oooo Table 3.12  Eigenvalues of Residual Covariance Matrix from Vector Autoregressive 
Model Used to Forecast Vector of Daily Pool Selling Price in 
NZEM-North  Island Reference Node 
Principal  Percentage of 
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1  .oooo Table 3.13  Eigenvalues of Residual Covariance Matrix from Vector Autoregressive 
Model Used to Forecast Vector of Daily Pool Selling Price in 
NZEMSouth Island Reference Node 
Principal  Percentage of 
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1 .oooo 126  Frank A. Wolak 
Several overall conclusions emerge from tables 3.4 through  3.13. The 
dynamics of the within-day variation in prices in the E&W market is more 
complex than the dynamics of the within-day variation in prices in the 
VicPool. Nord Pool prices show the least complex within-day price dy- 
namics of the three markets. Nord Pool prices are also by  far the most 
forecastable of the three price series, as measured by the R2  of the predic- 
tion regressions. E&W market prices and VicPool prices are predictable 
with approximately the same average R2  over all half-hour periods in the 
day. However, different from the VicPool, the highest priced load periods 
in the day in the E&W market are uniformly the most forecastable by this 
same measure. Although the short length of the New Zealand price series 
required estimating a more parsimonious autoregressive process for these 
prices, the differences in the results across North Island and South Island 
prices were consistent  with the results obtained for E&W  and VicPool 
prices versus Nord Pool prices. 
I now characterize differences in the behavior of the spot prices within 
the day and week across the peak and off-peak months of the year. Figure 
3.1A plots the average behavior of normalized prices throughout the day 
for the E&W market in winter (December, January, and February) and 
summer (June, July,  and August). To  compute the normalized price for 
any load period, I divide the actual price by  the sample mean price of 
electricity in the E&W market. Figure 3.1B plots the behavior of normal- 
ized prices throughout the week in summer and winter. These plots illus- 
trate an important feature of the behavior of prices in the E&W market. 
During the winter months, all weekday prices become very high during 
load periods 35 to 37. The average high price during weekdays (exclud- 
ing Fridays) is more than 4.0 times the sample mean of the spot price in 
load periods 35 to 37. Wolak and Patrick (1996b) argue that this pattern 
of prices represents the exercise of market power by National Power and 
PowerGen, the two major generators in the E&W market. 
Figure 3.2 presents the day and week  normalized price plots for Nord 
Pool. There appears to be little predictable variation in spot prices within 
the day and across days of the week in Nord Pool. The major movements 
in prices appear to be across the peak and off-peak seasons, with average 
summer prices significantly below average winter prices within the day 
and within the week. This reflects the view that water scarcity is a major 
determinant of prices in Nord Pool. 
The average pattern of prices within the day and week in the VicPool 
shares features with both Nord Pool and the E&W market (see fig. 3.3). 
For consistency with the other two figures, I have defined summer to be 
the months of June, July, and August and winter to be December, January, 
and February. For most half-hours, average prices in June, July, and Au- 
gust (summer) are higher than those in December, January, and February 
(winter). The differences in predictable price fluctuations within the day Restructured Electricity Markets: An International Comparison  127 
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England and Wales: average prices throughout the day (A)  and the 
and week  across the peak  and off-peak seasons is  not  nearly  as pro- 
nounced in the VicPool as it is in the E&W market. Both seasons exhibit 
more predictable variation within the day and week than do E&W prices 
in the summer, but less than E&W prices in the winter. 
Because no data exist for New Zealand for the months of June, July, 
and August, figure 3.4 plots the average prices in North and South Islands 
throughout  the day and week. The pattern of average prices within the 
day for both islands is very similar to the pattern of prices within the day 128  Frank A. Wolak 
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Fig. 3.2  Nord Pool: average prices throughout the day (A)  and the week (&) 
for Nord Pool. A similar statement can be said about the behavior of both 
New Zealand prices within the week. 
Figures 3.5, 3.6, and  3.7 plot  the period-level standard deviations of 
normalized prices within the day for the E&W market, Nord Pool, and 
the VicPool. Each point on this plot is the standard deviation of the nor- 
malized (by the  overall sample mean price) price for that  load period 
within the day for all days within that season. Figure 3.5 illustrates that 
although normalized prices in load periods 35 to 37 are known to be very Restructured Electricity Markets: An International Comparison  129 
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Fig. 3.3  VicPool: average prices throughout the day (A)  and the week (B) 
high, there is considerable uncertainty about precisely how high they will 
be. Figure 3.6 tells a similar story for the case of  mean prices within the 
day for Nord Pool. The uncertainty in normalized prices is uniform within 
the day in both summer and winter, but the uncertainty in normalized 
prices is uniformly higher in the summer than the winter. 
Figure 3.7 illustrates that for the most part the degree of uncertainty in 
normalized prices is very similar across load periods in the VicPool. The 130  Frank A. Wolak 
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Fig. 3.4  New Zealand average prices throughout the day (A)  and the week (B) 
only exception is that during the high-priced periods in December, Janu- 
ary, and February (the months of peak demand in Victoria), the uncer- 
tainty in normalized prices is highest during the highest priced periods of 
the day. 
Figure 3.8 computes the period-level standard deviations in normalized 
prices for North Island and South Island prices in  New Zealand. The 
pattern of uncertainty in these prices is very similar to the within-day un- 
certainty in prices in Nord Pool. The North Island standard deviations 
tend to be higher than the South Island standard deviations, particularly 
for the peak periods of  the day, reflecting the use of  fossil units during 
these time periods in North Island. Restructured Electricity Markets: An International Comparison  131 
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3.7  Market Structure and Market Rules 
and the Exercise of Market Power 
A significantly more detailed analysis of each of  these markets is re- 
quired to draw conclusions about the exercise of market power in any of 
these markets. However, the strong influence that both market structure 




5.5 .  '  5.0 . 





!??  5.0 
9 
5  4.5 
2  4.0 
3.5  P 
g  3.0 












I -  Winter Prce STD 
Summer Price STD  I  -_. 
A  _-_  _---  ---  -  -- 
Fig. 3.7  VicPool: standard deviation of prices throughout the day 
Fig. 3.8  New Zealand standard deviation of prices throughout the day 
suggests that  such  an  across-country  analysis should  have  significant 
promise to yield insights about how the interaction of  market rules and 
market structure allows the exercise of market power. 
The dramatically different pattern of  average electricity prices within 
the day and within the week in the E&W market relative to the other three 
markets does lend further support to the conclusion reached in Wolak 
and Patrick (1996a) that the two largest generators in the E&W market- Restructured Electricity Markets: An International Comparison  133 
National Power  and PowerGen-possess  significant market power  that 
they are able to exercise when certain conditions in the E&W market make 
the residual demand they jointly face extremely large relative to the capac- 
ity of these two large generating companies. 
The relatively flat pattern of average prices throughout  the day in the 
VicPool and the very low U.S. dollar prices for electricity from this market 
in 1996 and 1997 seem indicative of a very competitive electricity market. 
The relatively high degree of volatility in prices throughout the day in the 
VicPool (compared to Nord Pool and the NZEM) seems to indicate that 
generators are sometimes successful at obtaining high prices, but just as 
often their efforts yield very low prices, so that on average, prices for elec- 
tricity are very low. Consequently, the VicPool appears to be an example 
of  a market where the efforts of generators to exercise market power are 
on average unsuccessful. The evidence on the behavior of prices appears 
consistent with the conclusion that it is a more competitive market than 
the E&W market. Further research is necessary to determine whether this 
apparent  difference in  competitiveness is  due to differences in  market 
structure of the two markets or in market rules. 
Nord Pool and the NZEM present a more difficult puzzle because both 
markets are dominated by  large state-owned enterprises. We  would not 
expect these firms to exercise market power with the same vigor that pri- 
vately owned firms do. Nevertheless, both of these electricity supply indus- 
tries produce the vast majority of their power from very inexpensive hy- 
droelectric resources, so the higher U.S. dollar prices in these two markets 
relative to Victoria do raise suspicions about the exercise of market power 
by  the large state-owned firms. As discussed earlier, in the fall of  1992, 
Statkraft publicly announced a policy to keep spot prices above 100 NOW 
MWH, although subsequently prices have fallen below this level for long 
periods of time. The evidence from the behavior of prices in both Nord 
Pool and the NZEM relative to prices in Victoria and the E&W market 
seems to indicate that the large state-owned generators in Nord Pool and 
the NZEM are price leaders with the remaining firms serving as a compet- 
itive fringe. Further analysis of both of these markets is necessary to reach 
a more definitive conclusion about whether these outcomes represent mar- 
ket power. 
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Comment  Takatoshi Ito 
This is a well-structured, detailed paper on comparing structural changes 
in the electricity industries in selected countries and regions (Norway and 
Sweden, New Zealand, England and Wales, and Victoria). The following 
Takatoshi Ito is professor in the Institute of Economic Research at Hitotsubashi Univer- 
sity, Tokyo, and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Restructured Electricity Markets: An International Comparison  135 
three aspects stand out as interesting points in this paper. First, the elec- 
tricity industry was considered a typical example of a natural monopoly 
only fifteen years ago. This is no longer true. However, perfect competition 
is obviously not the case. Hence the problem is how to set a “market rule” 
to produce efficient and fair outcomes. Second, the industry is composed 
of two different subindustries, power generation and power distribution 
(transmission). It seems to be the trend that these two subindustries can 
be  treated  differently. Power generation  can be  privatized more easily. 
Third, trade aspects of the electricity industry depend on the location of 
the country. Obviously, Scandinavian countries can trade electricity more 
easily than Japan can with its neighbors. Let me elaborate on these points, 
especially from the viewpoint of lessons for Asian countries. 
First, it is good to see players respond to incentives, as detailed in the 
paper. Also, prices for electricity behave as theory predicts, according to 
market structure and market rules. It is shown that some larger companies 
reduce scale instead of expanding market share. This underscores the im- 
portance of setting the right market rule. But what is the optimal market 
rule? The paper indicates that the market rule depends on the type of 
power generation-oil,  hydroelectric, or nuclear. The market rule should 
be designed to reflect such differences, so a country or even a region (an 
island) of a country has to design its own market rule. 
Second, power generation and power distribution may be two different 
industries as far as market structure goes. Even Japan, a country often 
regarded as lagging in deregulation, has moved to deregulate power gener- 
ation. Regular companies can sell power to the public power companies 
(regional monopolies). Power distribution is similar to telephone service, 
railroad service, or any other distribution or transportation sector. There 
is tension between universal service and efficient allocation of resources. 
Power generation can be much more competitive. Many manufacturing 
companies potentially have capacity in power generation that can be sold 
back  to the  power  company  that  distributes to  retail  customers. It is 
difficult to decide how to compensate quality (penalties for blackout? Sub- 
sidies to current stability and universal service?). 
Third, in thinking of  trade aspects, the national boundary may not be 
a natural boundary of the industry. The examples in this paper, an ar- 
rangement  between England  and Wales and one between Norway and 
Sweden, show the extent and structure of a pool arrangement. A similar 
examination can be made, for example, of an arrangement between the 
regional monopolies in Japan. Another interesting aspect of the Japanese 
situation is that power plants were required to use domestic high-cost coal. 
If they were allowed to import coal, electricity prices may have been lower. 
Two important aspects that are beyond the scope of this paper deserve 
future research. Power generation types differ in many countries. France 
produces more than three-quarters of its electricity from nuclear power 136  Frank A. Wolak 
plants, while Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom produce about 
one-quarter of their power from nuclear plants. More than 60 percent of 
Canadian power is produced from hydroelectric power plants. These ratios 
reflect both the natural  endowments of countries and policy decisions. 
An important question is whether decisions concerning types of power 
generation should anticipate the market structure, which is governed by 
the (mix of) types of power generation. Until now, decisions about electric 
power have not considered the competition aspects of the industry. 
Alternative sources of electricity have been sought after. Locations for 
hydroelectric power plants have been exhausted in many advanced coun- 
tries, nuclear energy carries nuclear danger, and oil-burning plants pro- 
duce air pollution, although more advanced plants have cleaner technol- 
ogy. Whether R&D in alternative sources should be subsidized, and if so 
whether the funds should  be cross-subsidized from existing companies 
(customers), is an interesting question. 
Last, long after the conference in 1998, there was a prolonged blackout 
in New Zealand, one of the countries studied in this paper. A discussion 
of whether the power failure had anything to do with the market rule in 
that country would have been interesting. 
Comment  Francis T. Lui 
Frank Wolak has written a very readable paper from which I have learned 
a great deal. The paper consists of two parts. The first is a detailed descrip- 
tion of the market  structure, market rules, and regulatory  oversight of 
electricity markets in four different economies. The second is an empirical 
investigation of various aspects of the movement of electricity prices in 
the four economies. I will comment on each part separately. 
Knowing little about the electricity market and coming from a place 
where the regulatory system is relatively simple, I was surprised to learn 
of the elaborate institutional arrangements and regulatory schemes in the 
four economies. Suppose some undesirable consequences occur because 
of the imposition of  a regulatory  rule. Then there seem to be two ap- 
proaches to dealing with them. One is to get rid of the regulation or barri- 
ers to entry. This allows the free market to come in again as an alternative. 
The other is to design and introduce a more complicated set of new regula- 
tions. These possibly incentive-compatible regulations may mitigate the 
undesirable  effects found earlier. The sample of countries under  study 
seems to have chosen the second way. 
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Is this a good approach? The answer is not clear to me. In Hong Kong, 
China Light, the power company that supplies 80 percent of the electricity, 
is heavily regulated. Its profits cannot exceed a certain percentage of its 
assets. It has therefore decided to expand capacity rapidly, with the result 
that the maximum capacity is far bigger than peak load demand. On the 
other hand, the unregulated and sole provider of gas, Town Gas, enjoys a 
total factor productivity growth of 2 percent per annum. Wolak has col- 
lected a lot of data about the electricity market. It would be interesting to 
test from the data whether a complicated regulatory system can beat the 
free market. 
Another  interesting  issue is  the  political  economy  of  how  different 
places have adopted their own systems. Have they emerged because of 
political bargaining? Are they the intellectual products of some academics 
that are influential enough to implement their ideas? If political bargain- 
ing is the main reason, there is no guarantee that the resulting regulatory 
structure is optimal. It would be nice if the author could tell us more about 
the political economy background. 
The empirical part of the paper uses a number of techniques to investi- 
gate various properties of electricity prices-for  example, forecastability 
of  prices, their  variability, and whether their  changes can be  explained 
by just a few factors. Most of the results and interpretations seem to be 
reasonable. However, are the tests used powerful enough to answer the 
basic question, namely, how does market power depend on market struc- 
ture and market rules? In a sense, we have learned that (1) the price move- 
ments are different and (2) there are many technological and institutional 
differences across the countries. However, can we  be sure that the price 
behavior is due mainly to the market structure and market rules? There 
are only four places and four sets of observations. Is the basic question an- 
swerable? 
One way to make the answer more convincing is to construct data sets 
from many more countries. Then more information can be used for testing 
hypotheses. Another way is to identify refutable hypotheses from the first 
part of the paper and implement a number of tests in the second part. The 
linkage between the two parts is not too clear in some cases. Sometimes, 
the differences in price movements do not seem to have much to do with 
market rules and market structure. For example, the prices in Nord Pool 
are more predictable, but there is apparently just one dominating explana- 
tory variable, namely, whether there is enough water supply for hydroelec- 
tricity. There seems to be a need to articulate the discussion so that the 
linkage between the two parts of the paper is explicit and the hypotheses 
of the first part are tested. 
All in all, I like the paper. One can learn a lot of details about the in- 
dividual countries by reading it. 